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The Uniform Probate Code represents a monumental effort to
modernize the law of decedents' estates. In this, Part 1 of a multipart
article, Professor Averill examines the Wyoming law governing both
intestate and testate succession and compares Wyoming law with the
provisions of the Uniform Probate Code. This comparative approach
not only renders a comprehensive description of the status of present
law but also demonstrates the need for reform in Wyoming.

WYOMING'S LAW OF DECEDENTS'
ESTATES, GUARDIANSHIP AND TRUSTS:
A COMPARISON WITH THE UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE

--PART

I

Lawrence H. Averill, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION

HE word "probate"' in recent years symbolizes in the
minds of some persons the evils of graft, waste and delay.
The resultant cry has been "avoid probate." Several successful commercial enterprises have been launched from this conceptual pad and they accuse the legal profession of perpeAssociate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming
College of Law; A.B., Indiana University; J.D., The American University;
LL.M., The George Washington University; Member of the District of
Columbia, Maryland and Wyoming Bars.
1. Technically the word "probate" refers to the process of proving and deciding
the validity of a will before a court having competent jurisdiction; more
generally, it refers to all matters appropriately before the probate courts.
BLAcK's LAW DicTIONARY 1365-66 (4th Ed. 1951). To most laymen, it
probably refers to the law dealing with the disposition of property at
one's death.
CopyrightO 1972 by the University of Wyoming
*
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trating and perpetuating the undesirable situation.2 Public
confidence in the legal house of probate is certainly depressed.'
The source of much of the distrust is in the laws themselves. First, there is no real uniformity between the laws
of the fifty states. This fact not only may cause unjust results' but also an inherent confusion and distrust among a
very mobile lay populace.' Second, most of the current legislation on decedents' estates matters are not contemporary.
Their principal enactment dates range from over one hundred
years ago to sixty years ago. Even the latter laws do not
take into account the material changes in our society. Not
only has it changed from a primarily rural to primarily urban
and therefore from a proprietary emphasis directed to real
property to one directed toward forms of personal property
and other contractual relationships, but also from one educationally and sociologically provincial to one national and
even international in scope. Consequently, the present laws
on this matter do not generally deal with or at least adequately
pursue the primary problems faced by the average person in
distribution of wealth at death. Lastly, the relevant laws are
typically not adequately codified or in language which can
be easily, understood. Although central codification and
modern legislative draftsmanship are not usually reasons in
themselves for totally rewriting an area of law, their absence
in a particularly interrelated and fundamental area of law
such as that of decedents' estates may indicate that deficiencies, overlaps and confusion are a part of the laws' content
2.

BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS, ch. 11, pp. 233-63 (1968)

(Chapter

11 is entitled "Our Unknown Heirs"); DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE 8
(1965).
3. In October, 1966, the editors of the American Bar Association commented:
But we should be less than fair if we sought to excuse the abuses
in the probating of wills that are inducements to avoiding probate.
It is our belief that regardless of the merits of the revocable trust,
it is the duty of a vigilant organized Bar to take to heart the criticisms that have been aimed at lawyers and at the improper practices
of the probate courts. We should not be content to answer the problems by mere avoidance of probate on the part of our clients. We
should work assiduously to stamp out the evils the revocable trust
is calculated to avoid.
56 A.B.A.J. 938, 939 (1966).
4. For example, a will which would be valid and effective where executed may
not he where probated merely because the testator has changed his domicile.
5. The legal literature on this problem indicates that even lawyers are having
difficulty. E.g., Polasky, Estate Planning for the Migrant Executive,
2 U. MIAMI INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING

1 68-7

(1968); Scoles & Rheinstein,

Conflict Avoidance in Succession Planning, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 499
(1956); Scoles, Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning, 9 U. FLA. L. 'REv. 388
(1956).
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and application.' The same criticism can typically be stated
against the present laws concerning guardianship and trusts.
The Wyoming's statutory pattern on these matters is
subject more or less to all of the above criticisms. In addition, some clearly harmful omissions and inadequacies exist.
It is the intent of this article, therefore, to describe and examine Wyoming's present law of decedents' estates, guardianship and trusts and further to compare and analyze it in view
of the provisions of the recently published Uniform Probate
Code. The comparative analysis is justified for two reasons:
first, because the Code is the final product of a great deal of
thought, work and compromise by a large number of experts
concerned with and working in this area of law, it represents
an extremely useful comparative tool; and second, the Code or
its significantly inspired imitation will more than likely be
introduced into the Wyoming legislature sometime in the near
future. The article will therefore be useful both as a reference
source of present law and as a springboard and guide to the
changes which may and should occur in the future.
II. BaIEF HISTORY
A. Wyoming Law
The purpose of this section is to put into perspective the
chronological progress of legislation related to decedents'
estates, guardianship and trusts. No attempt will be made
to explain the provisions of the enactment other than to explain briefly the effect of amendments. For convenience and
organization this chronology is separated into six categories:
intestate distribution, testacy regulation, administration of
estates, guardianship, miscellaneous related enactments and
trusts.
6. Of course, the most vitriolic criticism
leveled at many of the present probate
laws is that they permit exorbi t nt fees for attorneys, administrators and
other probate officials. See references cited supra note 2. This criticism,
although the motivation behind much of the present movement for reform,
is not mentioned in the text because it does not go to the totality of the
problem. To remedy it would only reach the tip of the iceberg. If reform
is needed it is needed throughout the whole area of law. The truly valid
criticisms are those which concern this broader subject and that is why
they appear in the text of this article.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 8

172

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

Wyoming's intestacy provisions7 were enacted during the
first session of the legislative assembly on December 10, 1869.8
This act covered nearly the full range of intestacy questions
including the rights of all full blooded next of kin, half bloods,
illegitimates, posthumous children, aliens, children receiving
advancements, and children whose parents are divorced.'
Other than a minor amendment in 18771" and a little more
significant one in 1915,11 the basic distribution provisions have

remained unchanged.
Wyoming's will provisions 2 were enacted in 1882 by the
seventh legislative assembly.1" This act included the requirements and limitations on execution, revocation, will construction,14 appointment of executors, and several other procedural
matters. Other than an amendment in 1895 that specifically
permitted wills to be typewritten,15 no substantive alterations
of formalities have occurred. The surviving spouse's option or
forced share, however, was not added until 191516 and after a
significant substantive amendment in 1919,1" reached its
present form in 1957.1

Although the first session of the legislative assembly
enacted a law concerned with the administration of estates,"0
7. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-37 to -45 (1957).
8. Law of Dec. 10, 1869, ch. 41, [1869] Wyo. Laws 398-402.
9. The act also included a provision providing for a limited allowance of
personal property for the wife. Id.
10. Law of Dec. 15, 1877, [1877] Wyo. Laws 35. This amendment merely made
the under $10,000 proviso in favor of the surviving spouse limited to the
situation when "no child nor descendants of any child" were alive.
11. Ch. 4, §§ 1-3, [1915] Wyo. Sess. Law 4-5. The surviving spouse's rights
were significantly enhanced in that the $10,000 provision in favor of the
spouse was changed to $20,000; and, the spouse would get all of the
estate if there were no children, or parents or descendants of either. Ministerial alterations were also made such as removing the word "That" from
the beginning of Section 1; using arabic numbers rather than spelled out
numbers for the enumerated order of distribution; and, changing "leave
a husband or wife" language to "leaves husband or wife."
12. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-47 to -52 (1957, Supp. 1971).
13. Ch. 107, §§ 1-15, [18821 Wyo. Laws 211-12.
14. After acquired property passed by will.
15. Ch. 20, § 1, [1895] Wyo. Sess. Laws 43.
16. Ch. 149, 1§ 1-2, [1915] Wyo. Sess. Laws 230.
17. Ch. 21, § 1-2, [1919] Wyo. Sess. Laws 21. This act added the present
statutory language concerned with surviving children of a prior marriage
and no children of the present marriage causing the surviving subsequent
spouse to receive one-half of the normal share.
18. Ch. 204, §§ 1-2, [1957] Wyo. Sess. Laws 329-30. Other than minor ministerial changes, it added the requirement and procedure for notification to
the surviving spouse of the option by the judge of the probate court and
that the right may be exercised by the surviving spouse's personal representative or guardian.
19. Ch. 6, §§ 1-239, [1869] Laws of Wyo. 177-219. Wyoming apparently had
a probate procedure before it had a will validation statute. See supra
note 13.
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it was not until 1891 that the first state legislature enacted
the Probate Procedure Act2" which presently composes Wyoming's law of administration of decedents' estates. 2 ' Comparatively few and no truly significant alterations have been
made to the act.2 2 Several recent amendments are worthy of
mention, however, in that they have shortened many of the
limitation periods, with the idea of speeding the administration
process.2"
Wyoming's law of guardian and ward2 4 was also included
within the 1890-91 Probate Procedure Act 2 5 and has remained
basically unaltered with the exception that several acts have
been enacted dealing with specific situations.2 6
Several miscellaneous enactments deserve mention. Holographic wills2 7 were recognized in 1895" and a procedure was
adopted for their probate in 1925.29 The nuncupative will provisions of the 1890-91 Probate Procedure Act were repealed
in 1925."o The Uniform Foreign Probate Act was enacted in
20. Ch. 70, (chs. I-XX), [1890-91] Wyo. Sess. Laws 243-304. Substantially all
of the Wyoming Probate Procedure Act was copied from the probate part
(Title XI consisting of 12 chapters) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure of 1872. This Code was in turn primarily a redraft of the
California Probate Act of 1851 which apparently had a Texas origin.
In re Schroeder's Estate, 46 Cal. 304 (1873). California frequently added
and amended the 1872 Code until the 1931 Probate Code was enacted. The
1931 Code basically consolidated into one title the previously separate laws
of wills, succession, administration of decedents' estates and guardian and
ward: it was not intended to change the substance of the law. Frequent
piecemeal amendments have kept the Code in a slow rate of flux up to
the present. Turrentine, Introduction to California Probate Code, 52 CALIF.
PROBATE CODE 1-40 (West. 1956).
21. See Editor's note, Wyo. STAT. § 2-1 (1957).
22. Id. The Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act was enacted in 1959,
however. Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-336 to -346 (Supp. 1971).
23. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-47, -83, -89, -219 (Supp. 1971). The time limitations for
electing against a will, contesting a will and filing a claim against the
estate were shortened from six months to three months.
24. WYO. STAT. §§ 3-1 to -58 (1957).
25. Ch. 70, (chs. XXI-XXVI), [1890-91] Wyo. Sess. Laws 304-16.
26. Guardianship for Mental Incompetents or Incompetents, WYO. STAT.
§§ 3-29.1 to -29.15 (Supp. 1971); Conservators of Estates of Minors and
Incompetents Admitted to State Training School and State Hospital, WYo.
STAT. §§ 3-33.1 to -33.8 (Supp. 1971); Uniform Veterans' Guardianship
Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 3-59 to -77 (1957).
27. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-54 to -56 (1957).
28. Ch. 20, § 3, [1895] Wyo. Sess. Laws 43.
29. Ch. 40, §§ 1-3, [1925] Wyo. Sess. Laws 28.
30. Ch. 7, § 1-2, [1925] Wyo. Sess. Laws 6. This act failed to repeal the reference to nuncupative wills presently contained in Wyo. STAT. § 2-58 (1957).
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1921"' providing Wyoming with a very liberal Conflict of
Laws rule with regard to probate in Wyoming of wills previously probated elsewhere. 2 In 1915 the legislature added a
section33 which prohibited a person from obtaining property
by feloniously killing another.3 4 A provision" which per-

mitted a will to "pour over" assets into an amended trust
was enacted in 1957.6
Until recent years the Wyoming legislature has been

generally inactive with regard to the area of trusts. Much
of the activity has been piecemeal legislation concerned with
the liability of third persons dealing with trustees who are
acting in breach of trust.3 7 During the last ten years, however, there has been a flurry of significant legislation in the
area of trust law. In 196338 the Revised Uniform Principal
and Income Act was adopted. The 1965 legislature enacted'
the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act.' And, finally, after a
constitutional amendment in 1967 2 the "prudent man" fidu-

ciary investment standard 3 was adopted."
Except in the area of trust management, this historical
review reveals that Wyoming's basic statutory pattern in the
law of decedents' and wards' estates was set more than eighty
years ago.
B. The Uniform Probate Act
Although the official text of the Uniform Probate Code
as adopted in August, 1969, does not have a nineteenth century
31. Ch. 81, §§ 1-7, [1921] Wyo. Sess. Laws 85. Chapter XIX of the 1890-91
Probate Procedure Act included provisions for the probate of foreign wills.
The 1921 Uniform Act did not repeal these provisions although laws or
their parts inconsistent or in conflict with the Uniform Act were repealed.
The 1931 Revision Act finally specifically repealed the chapter. Ch. 73,
§ 179, [1931] Wyo. Sess. Laws 136-37.
32. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-67 to -71 (1957).
33. Ch. 95, §§ 1-2, [1915] Wyo.Sess. Laws 107.
34. WYO. STAT. § 2-46 (1957).
35. Ch. 180, § 1, [1957] Wyo. Sess. Laws 300.
36. WYO. STAT. § 2-53 (1957).
37. Uniform Fiduciaries Act, WYO. STAT. §§ 4-1 to -15 (1957) (sections 4-4 to
-8 were repealed when the UCC was enacted); Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, WYO. STAT. §§ 4-15.1 to -15.11
(Supp. 1971); WYO. STAT. 34-8-304(2), 34-10-102(2) (Supp. 1971) (Uniform Commercial Code).
38. Ch. 189, § 1-16, [1963] Wyo. Sess. Laws 331.
39. WYo. STAT. §§ 34-374 to -389 (Supp. 1971).
40. Ch. 54, § 1-10, [1965] Wyo. Sess. Laws 47-52.
41. WYo. STAT. §§ 4-36 to -45 (Supp. 1971).
42. WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 38.
43. WYO. STAT. §§ 4-19.1 to -19.5 (Supp. 1971) (Sections 4-16 to -19 repealed).
44, Ch. $6, § 1-7, [1967] Wyo. Sess. Laws 25-27.
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birthdate, its origin indicates that it is of establishment age.
In 1940 it was suggested to the American Bar Association
Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law that this
organization prepare a Model Probate Code. 45 This idea resulted in the publishing of the Model Probate Code in 19464"
which had an influence on legislation concerning decedents'
estates' matters in several states.4
Unfortunately this code had neither the scope nor the
impetus to influence a majority of states to adopt it. Therefore, in 1962, the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section was again challenged" to produce a uniform probate
law. It was also recommended and accepted that this project
be prepared with the cooperation of the well known, highly
respected and influential Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. After 6 drafts, six years in production and extensive
research, consultation and discussion,4 9 the final official text"
was approved in August, 1969, by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association.
The Code represents a comprehensive legislative guide"
to state legislatures or their committees for revision of the
whole area of decedents' estates, guardianship and trusts. At
least two states" have adopted legislation which was greatly
affected by the provisions and ideas of the drafts of the Code.
The literature on the Code is rapidly increasing" and states
45. Atkinson, Wanted-A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 183, 189
(1940).
46. PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw-A MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946). [Hereinafter
cited as Model Probate Code].
47. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1037,
1039 (1966). See also Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administration Under
the Uniform Probate Code, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 5 (1971); Durand, An
Introduction to the Uniform Probate Code, P-H SUCCESSFUL ESTATE PLANNING-IDEAS AND METHODS

15,001, at 15,002 (1969).

48. See Fratcher, Estate Planning and Administration Under the Uniform
Probate Code, 110 TRUSTS & ESTATES 5 (1971).
49. See Durand, supra note 47.
50.

UNIFORM PROBATE

CODE:

OFFICIAL TEXT WITH

COMMENTS

(West.

1970)

[hereinafter cited as U.P.C.]. An unofficial copy can be found in I P-H
ESTATE PLANNING-WILLS,

ESTATES AND TRUSTS, Report Bull. 6

(1969).

51. Wellman, A Reaction to the Chicago Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 536,
542. Professor Wellman, who was the Code's Chief Reporter, has emphasized that the Code will not be presented to legislators on a take-it-orleave-it basis. Id.
52. MD. ANN.- CODE art. 93 (Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 111.005-119.990
(Repl. 1969).
53. E.g., Diab New Jersey and the Uniform Probate Code, 2 SETON HALL L.
REV. 323 (1971); Durand, supra note 47; Fratcher, supra note 48; Haviland. Shall We Rebuild Our House of Probate? The Uniform Probate
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not possessing recently enacted legislation on these areas of
law will feel increasing pressure to do so from the sponsoring
organizations.
III.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION

A. General Patterns-Master Plan
The general intent of intestacy laws is to distribute a
person's wealth on his death in a pattern which represents a
close facsimile to that which the person would have designed
had he properly manifested his intent."' Obviously, to provide this on a general scale, the legislature has to develop an
objective rather than a subjective program which will necessarily be subject to debate. All of our common law states
have developed such patterns and although there is a definite
similarity between them significant differences do appear.
Since the laws have been enacted at various times in our
country's history, the moods of the legislatures under their
contemporary ideas of society have altered the intestacy
designs. An example of such a variation is the surviving
spouse's share in that the most recent concepts have encouraged larger shares than earlier legislation provided for that
spouse.
A description and comparison of Wyoming's law and of
the Code provision can best be achieved through the following
charts.
[Chart No. 1-Wyoming Law of Distribution]"5
Children
& Their
Spouse Descendants
1/2
1.
2. 20,000 None
3/4

Brothers
Grand& Sisters
parents, Uncles
& Their & Aunts & Their
Descendants
Parents Descendants
1/-

surviving

Code, 19 U. OF KAN. L. Rnv. 575 (1971); McKelroy, The Uniform Probate
Code: A Comparison with Existing Alabama Probate Law, 2 CUMBElLANDSAMFORD L. REv. 1 (1971); Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code,
56 A.B.A.J. 636 (1970). For a recent article which is hyper-critical of
the Code see Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code,
1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413.
54. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 22, Comment at 63. See also U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 1,
General Comment at 21.
55. WYQ, STAT. § 2-37 (1957).
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3. 20,000 None
surviving
3/4

4. All
5. None
surviving
6. None
surviving
7. None
surviving

None

1/4

surviving

None

None

surviving
All

surviving

None
surviving
None
surviving

None
surviving

-All

None
surviving

None
surviving

[Chart No. 2-Uniform Probate Code]56

Spouse

Children
& Their
Descendants

Brothers
Grandparents, Uncles
& Sisters
& Aunts & Their
& Their
Descendants
Parents Descendants

1. 50,000
1/2
'/21
(children of
another mariage)
2. 50,000 None
'/2
/2
surviving
None
3. All
None
surviving surviving
None
None
4. All
surviving surviving
5. None All
surviving
All
6. None None
surviv- surviving
ing
1/2

a. /2

None
surviving

56. U.P.C. §§ 2-102 [Share of the Spouse]; 2-103 [Share of Heirs Other Than
Surviving Spouse].
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None
surviving

None
surviving

All

None
surviving

None
surviving

None
surviving

1/
1/

paternal
maternal

The substantive variations between the two schemes are
insignificant if not merely a matter of opinion. The most
significant differences are that the Code is more detailed in
the situations covered and the $50,000 figure in favor of the
surviving spouse will protect that spouse more adequately in
a greater number of estates.
In some other areas not shown by the chart, the Wyoming
pattern is also similar to the Code. No distinctions between
real or personal property or between sex are made; the estate
is subject to debts of the decedent;57 and dower and curtesy
are abolished."
Although the concept of representation is permitted by a
descendant of a person entitled to receive a part of the estate
under both Wyoming's law and the Code, its application materially differs. The Wyoming statute is ambiguous with regard to which generation comprises the root generation for
purposes of determining the representative share of the surviving relative. The most likely interpretation is that the root
generation is that of the relative designated in the statute. 9
In other words for the descendants of children the root generation would be the children; for the descendants of brothers
and sisters it would be the brothers and sisters; and for the
descendants of uncles and aunts it would be the uncles and
aunts. These roots would remain the same regardless of
whether or not one of the specified relatives survived.
It is with this latter point that the Code differs from the
Wyoming approach. The root generation is designated to be
57. WYo. STAT. § 2-37 (1957); U.P.C. § 3-807.
58. WYO. STAT. § 2-37 (1957); U.P.C. § 2-113. There is also no distinction made
between ancestral and non-ancestral real estate. This old English common
law distinction has lost its validity in today's society. See generally,
ATKINSON, WILLS § 21 (2d ed. 1953).
59. The phrase "the descendants, collectively taking the share which their
parents would have taken if living" would seem to require this interpretation. See Note, 11 Wyo. L.J. 120 (1957).
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the one in which one relative survives; this generation provides the number for purposes of allocating the shares to those
who represent their ancestor."0 The following chart [No. 3]
is illustrative of the difference. If Child No. 1 is alive and
Child No. 2 and No. 3 are deceased, then the Code and Wyoming's law will distribute among the descendants in the same
manner: the portion which the descendants receive will be
divided into thirds with Child No. 1 receiving one-third and

the grandchildren of the other two children dividing their
ancestor's one-third equally
[Chart No. 3]
DECEDENT
Child #1

Child #2

Child #3

Grandchild#1

Grand- Grandchild#2 child#3

Grand- GrandGrandchild#4 child#5 child#6

Grandchildren #2 and #3 will receive one-sixth each and grandchildren #4-#6 will receive one-ninth each. If, however, all
of the children are dead, the two laws will divide it differently.
Wyoming would apparently still divide it in a true per stirpes
manner6 1 making the children the root generation. Consequently the portion would be divided into thirds again and the
grandchildren of each child would divide his third equally.
Grandchild #1 would obviously receive more than the other
since there is no one else with which to divide the third. The
Code would in this example divide the portion in a per capita
manner 2 thereby permitting each grandchild to receive an
equal share. If a grandchild was dead leaving descendants,
then the representation part of the Code would apply and the
grandchild's descendants would divide his share.
The rationale for this approach is that the probable intent of a decedent would be to divide a portion equally among
living relatives of equal degree but to favor a living relative
of a closer degree. Therefore, representation is only em60.
61.
62.
63.

U.P.C. § 2-106.
See Page, Descent Per Stripes and Per Capita, 1946 Wis. L. REV. 3.
See Id.
Cf. ATKINSON, WILLS § 18, at 71-72 (2d ed. 1953). See also Wellman,
A Reaction to the Chicago Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 536, 537; but see
Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 413, 417.
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ployed when the descendants are of unequal degree. In other
words, the root generation is the first generation leaving a
living representative.
Although the example discussed was directed to descendants of the decedent, the same approach is applied in the
same manner as indicated by the Code and by the Wyoming
statute regardless whether the situation concerns decedent's
descendants, or his brothers' and sisters' descendants or his
uncles' and aunts' descendants.
Another variation between the two laws concerns the
problem of distant relatives and their rights in the estate of a
decedent. Under Wyoming law a "shirt tail" relative is apparently entitled to share in the estate if no one mentioned in
the intestacy statute is living. 4 In other words, a relative,
who is related no closer than a great grandparent or his descendants or an even more distant one, could take as the nearest relative. Such relatives are frequently called "laughing
heirs" 5 because they obtain their share although far beyond
the normal confines of a family unit and thus far beyond the
probable donative intent of the decedent.
In determining who would take the share, Wyoming
would probably follow the majority rule and apply the civil
law method of counting degrees.66 This method counts each
generation from the descendant up to the common ancestor,
then counts from this ancestor to the claimant, totalling the
two figures.6 All claimants possessing the lowest total figure
share per capita; therefore, there is no representation under
this method.
The Code takes a different approach." To the delight of
all decedents' estates' students, there would be no more degree
64. The primary bases for justifying this conclusion are: (1) the Wyoming
escheat statutes, Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-687, -688 (1957, Supp. 1971), do not
specifically restrict intestate inheritance to the relatives mentioned in the
intestacy statutes; and, (2) the Wyoming Supreme Court held in Dutton
v. Donahue, 44 Wyo. 52, 8 P.2d 90 (1932), that any doubt in the application
of the escheat statutes should be construed against the state taking. The
answer to this problem is obviously not free from doubt, however.
65. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the "Laughing Heir," 20
IOWA L. REv. 203 (1935).
66. ATKINSON, supra note 63, at 69.
67. Id.
68. Wyoming does, of course, have an escheat procedure. WYo. STAT. § 9-687
(1957) ("fails for want of legal heirs") WYo. STAT. 9-688 (Supp. 1971)
(property "unclaimed for a period of five (5) years . . . shall be deemed
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counting problems in an intestacy situation. The Code pro-

vides that the property will escheat to the state if there are no
takers who qualify under the general intestacy pattern. 9
Grandparents and their descendants are the most distant relative who can inherit under the Code.7 This approach is
designed to simplify proof of relationship and to limit in-

heritance within the probable group a decedent would desire
to receive his estate. Considering that most families do not
remain in the same geographical areas anymore, let alone actually know each other, the Code's approach has significant
merit.7 '
Although in order to inherit from an intestate one must
survive his death, the general rule is that the survival need
not be for any specific length of time: one minute or theoretically one second is sufficient. When the question of whether
one or another person survived the decedent materially affects
who receives the assets of the estate, the timing of death becomes an extremely litigable issue. In a day when simultaneous death is a frequent possibility, the problem is magnified. Many states including Wyoming have attempted to

alleviate the problem by enacting what is called the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act.72 This Act provides that in an intestacy situation when "there is no sufficient evidence that
the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the
property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had
survived. ...

""

The solution is only a partial one, however,

because the Act is specific in that if there is adequate proof
of the time of the order of death, then it does not apply and
the surviving decedent, for however short period of time,"4
will be entitled to inherit his share of the prior decedent's
prima face evidence of the failure of title to such property for want of
legal heirs"). This procedure would apparently not apply if a person
could adequately prove his relationship to the decedent. See discussion
69.

supra note 64.
U.P.C. § 2-105.

70. U.P.C. § 2-103. See Chart No. 2 supra pp. 177-78.
71. The limitation was accepted by the Oregon legislature.

ORE. REV. STAT.

See also N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 112.055 (Repl. 1969).
§ 4-1.1(a) (8) (McKinney 1967) ; but see Zartman, supra note 63, at 416.

72. WYO. STAT. §§ 34-100 to -106 (1957). The act also applies to survivorship
problems raised in wills, inter vivos transfers, joint tenancies, tenancies by
the entireties and life insurance policies. See Note, 15 WYO. L.J. 229 (1961),
for a discussion of the act as it relates to jointly owned property.
73. WYo. STAT. § 34-102 (1957).
74. See Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961). (Proof of survival by
one second would rebut the Act's rule of construction).
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estate. This could cause undesirable litigation over who survived and unnecessary expense by requiring multiple administrations of the same property.
The Code has a creative solution to the problem. Drawing
upon a frequently employed estate planning device, the Code
requires that a person in order to qualify as an heir, must
survive the decedent for 120 hours.7" Although questions of
the time of survival are still a reasonable possibility," in most
situations this provision will prevent litigation over who has
survived and avoid multiple administration of the same property where it is totally unnecessary. The specific length or
phraseology of the time one has to survive seems to be the primary variation or debatable issue to this provision's adoption." This is readily alterable to suit the preferences of the
individual legislature.
B. Status
The Wyoming law and the Code take significantly varying approaches to many of the questions of status as such a
concept affects decedents' estates. The status of the posthumous heir conceived before but born alive after the death
of the decedent is a prime example. Under the Wyoming
statute only such posthumous descendants of the intestate are
entitled to take as one born during the intestate's lifetime. 8
This limitation would exclude heirs of collateral relatives who
are conceived before but born alive after the intestate's
death such as uncles, cousins, brothers and nephews. The
Code permits, however, all such "relatives" to inherit and
therefore would apparently include these classes of relatives
as well as descendants of the intestate. 9 The merits of either
75. U.P.C. 2-104. The time limitation does not apply if the property would
escheat to the state because of a death of an heir during this time limitation. Id. Maryland and Oregon have adopted the concept. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 93, § 3-110 (Supp. 1970) ("survive the decedent by thirty (30) full
days"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 112.085 (Repl. 1969) ("survive the decedent
by five days").
76. The most obvious problems which can occur is in determining whether the
person lived the full 120 hours. The Code, however, has attempted to aid
this inquiry by making certain facts or documents or both prima facie
proof or evidence of death or status or both. U.P.C. § 1-107.
77. See statutes cited supra note 75.
78. WYO. STAT. 2-39 (1957).
79. U.P.C. § 2-108. Unfortunately, the term "relatives" is not defined in the
Code: it probably includes all persons related to the intestate by consanquinity.
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approach is subject to personal preference." In all cases the
length of time will be determinable in that it will be no more
than the period of gestation from the death of the intestate
and the child will have to be born alive.
The special status of illegitimates as far as inheritance
is concerned has required that specific provision be made for
them both with regard to whom inherits from them and from
whom they inherit. Both Wyoming and the Code have special
provisions. Since both statutes permit illegitimates to inherit from the mother, one of the principal problems concerns
inheritance rights from the father."
Wyoming's statute
grants such rights if the "parents subsequently intermarry,
and such children be recognized after such intermarriage by
the father, to be his illegitimate children."" The Code pursues this in more detail and in more liberal fashion. In order
for the illegitimate to inherit from the father, the parents
need only participate in a "marriage ceremony before or after
the birth of the child."8 3 No recognition by the father of the
child as his illegitimate is required and in fact even the ceremony may be "void" without changing the child's rights.8 4
In addition, proof of paternity either before or after the
fathers death, establishes the illegitimate's rights in the
father's estate.8" Exposing the decedent male's estate to
paternity litigation may be subject to dispute. 6 The debate
centers around balancing the merit of protecting a minor child
who for no fault of his own is born illegitimate and who needs
protection versus the disruption and apparent unfairness
caused by an unknown illegitimate, who has reached maturity
and who has never been a part of the decedent's family, claiming his share from the estate. Both are extreme situations but
both typically represent the center of the controversy. Many
80. The Code's approach, although not its language, was accepted in Oregon.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 112.075 (Repl. 1969) Maryland, however, limited the
rights of posthumous inheritance to a child of the intestate. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 93, §§ 3-107, 1-205 (Repl. 1969).
81. The United States Supreme Court recently held that it was not a denial
of due process or of equal protection for a state to deny illegitimates rights
in their father's estate. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
82. WYo. STAT. § 2-44 (1957).
83. U.P.C. § 2-109(2) (i).
84. Id.
85. U.P.C. § 2-109(2) (ii). If proof of paternity is attempted after the father's
death, it must be established by "clear and convincing proof." Id.
86. Maryland did not accept this. MD.ANN. CODE art. 93, § 1-208 (Repl. 1969).
See also WYO. STAT. § 14-64 (1957).
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would contend that the Code represents the modern policy
in the direction of mitigating the impact of illegitimacy. The
Code's approach could also have a collateral benefit by motivating some to execute wills in order to exclude potential illegitimates."7
The inheritance rights from an illegitimate are also covered by the laws. Wyoming's statute places emphasis on the
definition of a "bastard or illegitimate person" and if one
falls within this characterization, the inheritance rights are
as follows: (1) to the surviving spouse and descendants as in
normal situations; (2) if no surviving descendants, the whole
estate goes to the surviving spouse; (3) if neither spouse nor
descendant survives, one-half to the mother and one-half to
her descendants and (4) if none of the above survive, to the
next of kin of the mother.8 8 The Code takes a direct approach.
Inheritance from an illegitimate is the same as from any other
person except the father or his relatives cannot inherit unless
the provisions covering when an illegitimate is a child of the
father are satisfied and if adjudication of paternity is the
method of creating that status only when the father has
treated the child as his and has not refused to support the
child.89 The Code's inclusion of the father and his kindred
under the limited situation as capable of inheriting is the
better approach."
An ambiguity which appears in the Wyoming statute concerns whether the illegitimate will inherit through his parents"' or his descendants inherit through him. This problem
can arise when the illegitimate would inherit through his
mother as her representative from the intestate, or when the
illegitimate has predeceased the intestate and it is the illegitimate's descendant claiming through his illegitimate ancestor's
estate as his representative. The Code specifically permits in87. Wellman, Some Effects of the Uniform Probate Code on Estate Planning,
4 U. MIAMI INST. ON ESTATE PLANNING, ch. 70-19, 70.1905 at 19-8 (1970).
88. WYO. STAT. § 2-88 (1957).

89. U.P.C. § 2-109.
90. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 3-108 (Repl. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 112.105
(Repl. 1969).
91. But cf. In re Cadwell's estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499 (1920) (adopted
son inherited from intestate brother of adopting father). The holding was
codified in 1969. WYO. STAT. § 1-721 (Supp. 1971).
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heritance in both situations. 2 The ambiguity under the Wyoming law should be removed in favor of the Code's approach. 8
With regard to a similar problem of status, i.e., adoption,
Wyoming's law 4 and the Code 5 are nearly identical in effect.
The adopted child inherits from and through96 the adopting
parents and the child's estate is inherited to and through
the adopting parents. Unfortunately the Wyoming section on
adoption is not included in the Decedents' Estates Title of
the 1957 Wyoming Statutes but instead is included in the Code
of Civil Procedure title.
The Wyoming section is materially deficient in one aspect, however. It does not mention whether the adopted child

can inherit from or through his natural parents. Since the
section does not prohibit this, apparently he is able to do so."
The Code correctly deals with the problem by specifically
stating that an adopted child is not the child of his natural
parents: when the adoption is by a spouse of a natural parent,
the adoption, of course, has no effect on the relationship of
that natural parent and the child. 8 This is the bctter rule in
that it fully carries out the intent and the effect of an adoption,
i.e., to make the adopted child the child of the adopting parents
in all legal relations. Concomitantly, all legal relations to the
natural parents should be severed.
92. U.P.C. § 2.109.
93. A problem, which has arisen in recent years and which neither body of
law specifically considers, is the legitimacy of children conceived by artificial insemination when the semen of a third party donor is used. Cf.
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963)
(child held to be illegitimate). But ef. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.2d 280,
437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968) (child held to be legitimate). The
earlier drafts of the Code contained a provision on this problem but it
was omitted in the Fifth Working Draft and in the Final Official Text.
Compare Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1037, 1078 (1966) (quoting § 2 of the FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT, pt. II);
U.P.C., THIRD WORKING DRAFT, § 2-111(b) (1967); U.P.C., FOURTH WORKING DRAFT, § 2-111 (a) (1968), with U.P.C., FIFTH WORKING DRAFT, § 2-109;
U.P.C. § 2-109. No explanation is given for the omission. Presumably, the
strong presumption of legitimacy for children born in wedlock is being
relied upon. It might be advisable to reinstate the provision similar to that
found in those early drafts. Maryland included a special provision on the
matter. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 1-206(b) (Repl. 1969). See also ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 61-141 (c) (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-53
(Supp. 1967).
94. WYo. STAT. § 1-721 (Supp. 1971).
95. U.P.C. § 2-109(1).
96. See supra note 91.
97. ATKINSON, WILLS § 23, at 89 (2d ed. 1953). But cf. WYo. STAT. § 1-708 (B)
(Supp. 1971) (files to be kept confidental).
98. U.P.C. § 2-109(1).
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A problem of status which has received more legislative
attention than it should have is that of the rights of aliens.
The Wyoming statute, enacted in 1959, provides that an alien
may inherit real estate; however, no non-resident foreign citizen alien can inherit or take by testamentary disposition real
property in Wyoming if the laws of the alien's country do not
allow citizens of the United States to take real property by
succession or by testamentary disposition.9 This legislation
is frequently called an "Iron Curtain Act" because it generally applies to the laws of the so called Iron Curtain
countries which fail to qualify on the reciprocity requirement.
Apparently there is no such restriction on an alien taking
personal property in Wyoming.
The Code takes less than two printed lines to deal with
this situation. There is no restriction on an alien inheriting
any kind property regardless of the laws of his country.0 0
The stated reasons are clear and convincing.'. The prohibition of aliens inheriting property is an ancient rule possessing
a rationale applicable only to feudal times. In addition, a
recent Supreme Court case held a restrictive state statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the reciprocal requirement
of the statute involved a question of foreign policy which thus
made it "an intrustion by the state into the field of foreign
affairs which the Constitution entrusted to the President and
Congress."'0 2 Consequently the drafters of the Code felt it
wise to put no restriction an alien inheritance rights. Wyoming would be well advised to do the same, too.
Half blooded relatives of the decedent have often also
had their inheritance rights restricted. The general American
rule, however, is to treat such relatives the same as whole
blood ones1"' and the Code follows this rule.10 4 Wyoming,
however, has a most curious and perplexing statute with respect to these relatives. Briefly the section provides that
children and their descendants of the half-blood inherit the
99. WYO. STAT. § 2-43.1 (Supp. 1971). In addition, the burden of proving that
reciprocity exists is on the non-resident alien. WYO. STAT. § 2-43.2 (Supp.
100. 1971).
U.P.C. § 2-112.
101. U.P.C. 2-112, Comment at 28.
102. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
103. ATKINSON, WILLS § 19, at 74 (2d ed. 1953).
104. U.P.C. § 2-107.
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same as their counterparts of the whole blood but that collateral relatives of the half blood inherit only one-half the
share of collateral of the whole blood." 5 The meaning of
this section is not clear because one cannot have half-blood
children or descendants; one can only have half blooded collaterals. Consequently, the section would seem to mean that
half blood relatives inherit one-half of the whole blooded
relative's share"0 6 and the reference to children and descendants of childen of the half-blood is a nullity.0 7 Wyoming
definitely needs to correct this situation.
C. Prior Transactions and Events
A problem which occasionally arises with respect to the
shares to which a child or his descendant is entitled under
the intestacy statute is that of advancements.' °8 An advancement is an irrevocable gift of money or property, real or personal, to a child by a parent which enables the child to anticipate his inheritance to the extent of the gift. If it is determined
that a child has received an advancement and if he constructively brings his advancement into the "hotchpot," the value
is added to the estate and the recipient is then allowed to take
from the estate the excess of his share over his advancement. 00
The theory of this concept is to bring about equality between
the children of a decedent."0 The advancement concept does
not apply when there is a will which disposes of all the decedent's estate and by majority rule does not apply when there
is partial intestacy."'
The basic question when there has been an inter vivos
gift by a parent to a child is whether it is an advancement.
Not all such gifts are so characterized. The intent of the
donor at the time of the gift is the determinative factor."'
Seldom, however, does one find that the parent has clearly
WYO. STAT. § 2-40 (1957).
106. Cf. Trustees of Univ. of Wyo. v. Eadie, 50 Wyo. 153, 58 P.2d 431 (1936),
rehearingdenied, 50 Wyo. 179, 60 P.2d 364.
107. But cf. Finley v. Abner, 129 F. 734 (8th Cir. 1904).
108. See generally ATKINSON, WILLS § 129 (2d ed. 1953).
109. If the child's advancement is more in value than his share from the estate,
he will not participate in the hotchpot. On the other hand, he will not
receive his intestate share, either.
110. An advancement brought into the hotchpot will not affect the surviving
spouse's share, however. ATKINSON, supra note 108, at 722.
111. Id. at 723-24.
112. Id. at 721.

105.
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indicated his intent. The transferring document, if there
even is any, will seldom specifically indicate one way or the
other. The courts have, therefore, generally liberally admitted
extrinsic evidence, including the decedent's declarations, in
order to determine the intent. Since even this has not been satisfactory, presumptions have developed. For example, a distinction has been made between gifts given for the child's
pleasure and those which are employed for his profit. Whereas the latter type of gift has been said to be an indication of
an intent to make an advancement, the former type has not.'13
Wyoming legislatively recognizes the advancement concept. 1 '4 The applicable procedure provides that, upon application by the other heirs, a hearing before the judge and a determination of the amount of advancement, any advancement
to the children11 of the decedent shall be charged against his
share. An additional section provides that gifts for maintenance, education or allowance to a child before majority without more express indication of intent are not advancements."'
Other than the latter proviso, no guidance either legislative
or judicial is provided for determining the status of a gift
to a child and therefore the common law decisions and rules
discussed above would be relevant.
The Code has attempted to clarify the rules with respect
to advancements. In addition, the scope of the advancement
concept is materially restricted. In order for a gift to be considered as such, the donor must have "declared in a contemporaneous writing" or the donee must have acknowledged
in writing that it is an advancement.1 ' This is in line with
modern practice since most gifts today are not thought of
as transfers in anticipation of an inheritance. It removes the
evidentiary problem of proving intent by requiring the intent
to be in writing. This is not overburdensome on the donor if
to give an advancement is his intent. Valuation of an expressed advancement is determined as of the time of the
113. Id. at 720.
114. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-41, -299 (1957).
115. WYo. STAT. § 2-299 (1957) uses the word "heirs." It is doubtful, however,
that a substantive change was intended.
116. WYo. STAT. § 2-42 (1957).
117. U.P.C. § 2-110. Accord, MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 3-106 (Repl. 1969); ORE.
CODE ANN. § 112.135 (Repl. 1969).
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donee's possession or enjoyment or as of the donor's death,
whichever occurs first.
An additional provision in the Code deals with the rights
the
donor's estate of the descendants of a predeceased adin
vancee. The Code specifically provides that an intended advancement does not affect the share of the donee's issue unless
again the writing expressing the status of the gift so provides."' The common law on this matter was not uniform and
statutory clarification is desirable."'
A prior event which may affect a person's right to inherit is the question of disqualification for misconduct.'
Primarily the concern is in the situation where the decedent
is murdered by one of the successors to his property. Without statutes prohibiting the taking, some state courts have
held that the murderer can take his reward. 1 ' In order to
correct what is felt to be an injustice, most states, including
Wyoming, enacted statutes to specifically prohibit the felon
from profiting by his wrongdoing.
The Wyoming statute'2 2 is broad in scope in that it
prevents one who feloniously 2 ' takes the life of another
from taking from such person by way of intestacy, testacy or
by way of insurance contract on the life of that person.
Unfortunately, it is deficient in several respects. It does not
apply to survivorship interests or to most contract interests
other than the life insurance related ones. Except for an intestate share, it does not appropriately dispose of the assets
when a disqualification occurs. Since the property will pass
as if the decedent died intestate, there is a substantial potentiality of defeating the intent of the decedent in a testate or
contract situation. In addition, no provision is made for the
manner in which the claimant, alleging that a person feloniously took the life of another, is going to prove the event. Unless
118. U.P.C. § 2-110. But see MODEL PROBATE CODE § 29(c), at 66; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 93, § 3-106 (Repl. 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 112.155 (Repl. 1969).
The Code applies the same rule to descendants of predeceased heirs who
owe debts to the decedent. U.P.C. § 2-111.
119. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 129, at 722-23 (2d ed. 1953).
120. See generally id. § 37.
121. Id. § 37 at 153. But see Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P.2d 170, 172 (Wyo. 1970).
122. WYO. STAT. § 2-46 (1957).
123. This word was recently held to require an "intentional" killing; involuntary
manslaughter, although a felony, was held not within the meaning of the
word. Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1970),
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the alleged felon pleads guilty, his conviction of the crime is
not admissible in evidence in a civil action on the same crime"'
and this would apparently apply to an administration of an
estate matter. If the claimants must prove the crime before
the probate court, nothing is mentioned concerning what the
standard of proof will be, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt,
clear and convincing or by a preponderance.
The Code covers all of these points in its section.2 on
the matter. All possible forms of receiving assets or property
of another are covered. 2 ' In addition, the method of disposing
of the forfeited assets is improved by treating the felon as
having predeceased the decedent and not that the latter died
intestate.1" This permits the property to pass according to
the rules related to the type of transaction involved. For
example, a forfeited general legacy would pass to the residuary beneficiaries in the will or a forfeited life insurance payment would be paid to the alternative beneficiaries. With regard to proof, the Code makes a final judgment of conviction
conclusive in the probate court and lays down the "preponderance test" for an actual litigation of the event in the probate
The Code also protects all bona fide purchasers who
court.
purchase assets and the insurance company for payment to
the wrongdoer.1 2
124. WYO.

STAT.

§ 6-13 (1957).

125. U.P.C. § 2-803.
126. U.P.C. § 2-803(a)-(d).
127. Id.
128. U.P.C. § 2-803(e).
129. U.P.C. § 2-803(f). Two related problems not covered by either the Wyoming statutes or the Code are releases and assignments of expectancies.
Although both concepts are maybe related more to contract law than
to decedents' estates law, some problems can occur within the administration of the estate. A principal problem is whether these devices bind
the appropriate next of kin of the next of kin who has transferred his
expectancy. The general rule is that it does bind them when a release has
been made to the intestate himself but not when an assignment has been
made to a third person. The rationale for this difference in approach is
that a release is a transaction between the intestate and his potential next
of kin whereas an assignment does not involve the intestate. Consequently, it is by focusing on the intestate and his presumed intent to cut
off the potential next of kin's line of inheritance that the reason for the
difference is apparent. See generally ATKINSON, WILLS §§ 130-31 (2d ed.
1953). It might be wise to enact a provision which covers at least the
problem of a release of an expectancy.
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1W. ALLOWANCES, HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS

Both Wyoming statutes' and the Code contain an array
of protective devices for the surviving spouse and certain
children. The following chart [No. 4] best illustrates the basic
provisions and how the laws compare to each other.
[Chart No. 4]
Homestead
Code181
$5,000
In favor of surviving spouse

Wyoming
$4,000132
In favor of surviving spouse
or

or
Minor or dependent children

Minor children
or
1/ surviving spouse-

minor children from
another marriage8 s
1/2

Decedent must be a domiciliary

Decedent must be a resident"'

Exempt from all claims against
the estate [except security
interests on the property
itself] ...

Exempt from claims against
the estate except expenses of administration, of
last sickness, funeral expenses and security interests on the property

itself"'6
180. The Wyoming provisions on homestead, exempted property and family
allowances for decedents' estates are found both in Titles 1 and 2 of the
1957 Wyoming Statutes since the normal debtor protections are incorporated in a modified fashion into the provisions for decedents' estates.
WYO. STAT. § 2-213 (1957). See also Wambeke v. Hopkins, 372 P.2d 470
(Wyo. 1962).
131. U.P.C. § 2-401.
132. WYo. CONST. art. 19, § 9; Wyo. STAT. § 2-217 (1957). See generally Note,
16 Wyo. L.J. 81 (1961).
133. WYo. STAT. § 2-213 (1957).
134. Id. But cf. Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, 384 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1963) (the surviving
spouse's nonresidency is'not a bar to taking advantage of the homestead
provision).
135. See U.P.C. §§ 3-803, -809, -814.
136. WYo. STAT. §§ 2-212, -213, -215 (1957). The Wyoming Constitution adds:
sale for taxes, secured obligations and mechanics' liens. WYO. CQNST, art,

19, § 9.
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May be waived"'

[No similar provision] " '

Phrased in terms of a monetary
allowance

Phrased in terms of a household"'9 but if none a
monetary allowance is
granted'

It is in addition to any share
passing to beneficiaries by
will unless otherwise provided, 4 1 by intestacy or by
elective share of spouse

[No express provision but it
is presumed to be the
case]" 2

Exempt Property

Code""3
Up to $3,500
If favor of surviving spouse

Wyoming
Approximately $650...
Surviving spouse

or

or

Children (Need not be minors)

Minor children..

Decedent must be a domiciliary

Decedent must be a resident'48

Priority over all claims against
the estate [except security
interests on the property
itself. 4 ]

Exempt from claims against
the estate except expenses of administration,
last sickness, funeral expenses and security interests on the property
itself 4 '

137. U.P.C. § 2-204. This section definitely applies to a waiver between the
spouses but a question of interpretation could arise as to whether it would
apply to a waiver to a creditor holding an unsecured obligation.
138. But Cf. WYO. STAT. § 34-53 (1957).
139. WYO. STAT. § 1-501 (1957).
140. WYO. STAT. § 2-213 (1957).
141. A testator's will may specifically make the provisions in the will for the
surviving spouse in lieu of these rights. U.P.C. § 2-206(b).
142. See WYo. STAT. § 2-213 (1957). Cf. Dixon v. Dixon, 73 Wyo. 236, 278 P.2d
258, 259 (1954).
143. U.P.C. § 2-402.
144. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-504 (wearing apparel up to $150), -505 (personal property
up to $500) (1957).
145. WYO. STAT. § 2-213 (1957).
146. Id. See Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, supra note 134.
147. See authorities cited supra note 135.
148. See authorities cited supra note 136.
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May be abated by homestead
and family allowance

[No similar provision]

Household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal effects

Wearing apparel ($150)
furniture, bedding, provisions and other household articles ($500) 150

149

or
Other assets if above not
sufficient

or
A monetary value equal
to the maximum amount

May be waived...

[No similar provision]

It is in addition to any share
passing to beneficiaries by
will unless otherwise provided,"5 2 by intestacy or by
elective share of spouse

[No express provision but it
is presumed to be the
case 153]

Family Allowance

Code 1.
Reasonable allowance in money
out of the estate [not to exceed $6,000 per year or
$500 per month.5 5 ]
In favor of surviving spouse

Wyomnig
Reasonable provision for
support and possession
and use of household,
clothing and utensils..
In favor of surviving spouse
or

and
Minor and dependent children (payable to spouse if
children living with spouse
otherwise one-half to guardian)
Decedent must be a domiciliary
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Minor children

Not specified-probably
resident

a

WYO. STAT. § 1-504 (1957).
WYO. STAT. § 1-505 (1957).
See authority and discussion supra note 137.
See authority and discussion supra note 141.
See authority cited supra note 142.
U.P.C. § 2-403.
U.P.C. § 2-404.
WYO. STAT. § 2-210 (1957). See generally Dixon v. Dixon, 73 Wyo. 236,
252-55, 278 P.2d 258, 262-64 (1954).
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Exempt from all claims against
the estate up to the $5,000
homestead allowance

Vol. VII

Preference to all claims
against the estate except
expenses of administration, funeral expenses
and security interests
against specific property

157

Lump sum or periodic installments

Not specified

For period of administration
BUT

For period of administration 5 '

For only one year if estate is
insolvent
It is in addition to any share
passing to beneficiaries by
will unless otherwise provided," 9 by intestacy or by
elective share of spouse

[No similar provision]
[No express provision but it
is presumed to be the
case0 0 ]

Miscellaneous Procedural Provisions
Code '
Informal Procedure

Wyoming 62
Formal Procedure for claiming rights

Control is in personal representative-court is in-

Control is in court' 63

volved if requested by personal representative or
other interested person
157. See authorities cited supra note 136.
158. See WYO. STAT. § 2-211 (1957). The Wyoming Supreme Court has held
that the widow is entitled to her allowance from the date of death to the
time when the executor objects because partial distribution of the estate
has been made to the widow. Dixon v. Dixon 73 Wyo. 236, 253-54, 278
P.2d 258, 263-64 (1954).
159. See authority and discussion supra note 141.
160. See authorities cited supra note 142.
161. U.P.C. § 2-404.
162. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-210, -211, -214 (1957).
163. The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that the executor may make allowance payments to the surviving spouse without an order of court which
payments will be subsequently approved by the court if reasonable. Dixon
v. Dixon, 78 Wyo. 236, 253, 278 P.2d 258, 263 (1954).
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If sufficient assets in the es- Basically similar approach 6
state, specific devises are
not to be used to satisfy
above rights
The basic differences between the two laws are that the
Code provides for larger amounts and is more specific on
many of the problems. These factors would seem to be advantageous, in that they relate more to the problems of modern
decedents' estates law. In addition, separating decedent estates' protections from debtors' estates has the advantage of
reducing confusion. 65
V.

TESTATION LIMITATIONS

Although apparently not of constitutional proportions,'
the concept of freedom of testamentary and inter vivos disposition is generally recognized throughout the United
States."' In fact this concept is one of the pervasive policies
of the law of property disposition. 6 ' There are other important policies, however, which sometimes conflict with this
policy.'69 The policy of protection of the family unit, for
example, is one which has motivated legislatures to restrict
full freedom of disposition and which will continue to do so
in the future. The most significant and widely found restrictions are statutes which protect the minimum rights of the
surviving spouse and which guard against unintentional issue
disinheritance. 70
A. Surviving Spouse.
The idea of providing the surviving spouse protection
from total disinheritance is partially derived from the common law concepts of dower and curtesy. Although many states,
164. See WYO. STAT. § 2-297 (1957).
165. But see Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Court, 1970
U. ILL. L.F. 413, 424-25.
166. ATKINSON, WILLS § 5, at 31 (2d ed. 1953).
167. Id. at 34-35.
168.

ScoLEs & HALLBACH, PROBLEMS AND
AND TRUSTS 22 (1965).

MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES

169. Id. at 21-23.
170. See ATKINSON, supra note 166, §§ 30, 36, at 108, 140. The family protection discussed supra pp. 191-95 are also limitations on testation. Another
restriction sometimes found is one on charitable bequests and devises. See
generally id. § 35. Since neither Wyoming nor the Code includes such
provisions, will not be discussed.
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including Wyoming, 7 ' abolished these concepts, substitutes
were enacted.7 2 which were more consistent with the needs of
the time. For non community 7 property states these substitutes, of course, arc the "forced share" and "spouse's elective share" statutes.
Wyoming's forced share statute provides that if the
decedent spouse in a valid will deprives "his or her husband
or wife of over one-half of his or her property remaining after
the payment of his or her debts, it shall be optional with the
surviving spouse after the death of the testator or testatrix
to accept the condition of such will or one-half of the estate,
real and personal, of the deceased spouse."' 7 4 The quoted
phrase is extremely illuminating with respect to the scope of
the surviving spouse's rights and of the restriction on testation: (1) the option is only available if over one-half of the
probate estate is denied the surviving spouse; (2) the property
to which the election attaches is subject to the debts of the
decedent; (3) the option applies against real and personal
property; (4) the elected property passes in fee; (5) inter
vivos transfers are not affected; and, (6) the right is an option and not a mandate which the surviving spouse must
affirmatively exercise. In addition, the statute's application
is apparently not limited to decedents domiciled in Wyoming.
Procedurally,1 7 5 unless the option is exercised in a notarized writing within three months after the probate of the decedent spouse's will, it is forfeited and the will controls the
distribution of the estate. The judge of the probate court is
instructed to advise the surviving spouse of the option within
sixty days from the date of probate. If not so advised within
this period, the surviving spouse has thirty more days from
the day of receiving the advice. The same rules apply to
171. Wyo. STAT. § 2-37 (1957).
172. North Dakota and South Dakota are the noted exceptions which do not
protect the surviving spouse other than by the homestead and family
allowances. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-02 (1960); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 29-1-3 (1967). See also ATKINSON, supra note 166, § 30, at 108.
173. Eight states have enacted community property laws. See Fratcher, Toward
Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 1037, 1053 (1966).

174. WYO. STAT. § 2-47 (Supp. 1971). The will must deprive the surviving
spouse of over three fourths of the estate if children or their descendants
of a prior marriage survive and the surviving spouse has no children or
their descendants surviving the subsequent marriage. Id.
175. Id.
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advising a guardian or personal representative of a surviving
spouse who is or becomes incompetent or dies within three
months of the date of probate.
Judicial decisions have also explored the scope and limitations of the forced share right. The Supreme Court has permitted a waiver of the forced share in an antenuptial agreement which was entered into voluntarily without fraud and
with reasonable understanding.. and presumably it would
similarly recognize a postnuptial agreement which satisfies
the same standard.'7 7 In addition, judicial determination has
set out the effect on the interests of other testamentary beneficiaries of a spouse electing her share. 7 ' The court determined that until satisfied the forced share interest is charged
on all of the property of the estate not necessary for the
payment of debts.'1T Individual assets, however, may be used
In deciding what assets to use in
to discharge this interest.'
discharging the interest, the provisions of the will should be
disturbed as little as possible.8 1 and property given by the
will to the spouse may be used to satisfy the interest when it
makes for the best adjustment." 2
As the drafters comment, the Code's technique for the
elective share of the surviving spouse is controversial and
complex."' Its basic premise is similar to the one in Wyoming: the surviving spouse is entitled to protection from
disinheritance. From this point on, the similarity vanishes.
In the first place, the surviving spouse8 . is entitled to the
election only if the decedent was domiciled in the state where
the Code applies; otherwise the law of the decedent's domicile
This is a good provision because it
controls those rights.'
promotes uniformity of distribution of a decedent's estate ac176. In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1964).
177. See ATKINSON, supra note 166, § 31, at 111.
178. Dixon v. Dixon, 66 Wyo. 197, 207 P.2d 510 (1949); Dixon v. Dixon, 73
Wyo. 236, 278 P.2d 258 (1954).
179. 66 Wyo. at 209, 207 P.2d at 513.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 218, 207 P.2d at 517; 73 Wyo. at 250, 278 P.2d at 262.
182. 73 Wyo. at 243-49, 278 P.2d at 261.
183. U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 2, General Comment at 29-30.
184. The term "surviving spouse" is defined for this part of the Code. U.P.C.
§ 2-802.
185. U.P.C. § 2-201(b).
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cording to the laws of only one state... rather than the checker7
board approach which has occurred under some situations.
If the domicile requirement is met, then the surviving
spouse may elect to take one-third of the "augmented estate...... The Code, of course, defines what this concept
means.8 9 First it includes what is normally thought of as the
probate estate less debts, funeral and administration expenses,
the homestead allowance, exemptions and the family allowance.1 90 Second, it includes inter vivos gratuitous transfers:
which are irrevocable, exceed $3,000 per year per person and
made within two years of death ;9' in which the decedent retained a life interest until death,9 2 or a power, either alone
or in conjunction with any other person, to revoke, consume
or otherwise control the disposition for his own benefit; '
or in which he possessed a right of survivorship at the time
of his death. 9 4 All is not favorable to the surviving spouse,
however. The third group of assets included are all those
which the surviving spouse has received from the decedent
spouse during their joint lifetime as a gift or by way of contract, survivorship, appointment and any other property derived from the decedent. 9 ' In addition, the augmented estate excludes the decedent's transfers made before marriage,
or made with the consent of the surviving spouse and all of
the decedent's life insurance, accident insurance, joint annuities or pensions payable to a person other than the surviving
spouse. 9 '
This statutory hotchpot constitutes the amount to which
the one-third interest is to be applied. Of course, those assets
in the augmented estate which the surviving spouse received
by testate or intestate succession or by the means described
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

New York and Oregon have similar requirements. N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(d) (7) (McKinney 1970 Supp.); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 114.105 (Repl. 1969).
See generally LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 195, at 478 (1968).
U.P.C. § 2-201 (a).
See generally Fratcher, supra note 173, at 1058-64.
U.P.C. § 2-202.

191. U.P.C. § 2-202(1) (iv).
192. U.P.C. § 2-202(1) (i).
193. U.P.C. § 2-202(1) (ii).

194. U.P.C. § 2-202 (1)(iii).
195.

U.P.C. § 2-202(3).

196. U.P.C. § 2-202 (2).
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above are to be used first to satisfy the elective share.19
Equitable apportionment is applied to the other beneficiaries
for all losses suffered in order to make up a deficiency which
may occur.' 98 For those who received their property or interest during the decedent's lifetime, only the original recipients
and their donees are subject to contribution and even then an
option is given to give up the transferred property or its
equivalent value.' 9 9
The general rationales of this complex method of protecting the surviving spouse are threefold: (1) to continue
the familiar protective forced share concept, (2) to prevent
will substitutes from defeating the prior purpose, and (3)
to prevent the surviving spouse from electing the forced share
when an adequate share has already been provided."'
The essence of these rationales, interestingly, is really in
the first one. If the forced share type of protective device
is to be continued,"0 ' one should not be able to so easily avoid
the public policy by the use of the multitude of will substitutes. 0 2 Concomitantly, the public policy is certainly not served by the surviving spouse's ability to obtain more than even
the most liberal outside reaches of the intent of the protection
policy."' It is therefore necessary to make this spouse declare
his full benefit received for purposes of adjustment. Obviously the latter two propositions, in order to accomplish
their purposes, are necessarily complex and will cause fact
finding problems when and if litigation occurs. Consequently,
197.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

203.

U.P.C. § 2-207(a). The surviving spouse may renounce all or any of the
rights under provisions of the will or under intestate succession, otherwise
these rights are unaffected by the election. If he does, these provisions
pass as if this spouse had predeceased the decedent except as contribution
may have to be made in favor of the other legatees under the will. U.P.C.
§ 2-206 (a).
U.P.C. § 2-207(b).
U.P.C. § 2-207(c). Absolute protection of third persons dealing with donees
may permit avoidance of the Code's intent; however, it is probably essential
for purposes of clearing title to property.
See U.P.C. art. 2, pt. 2, General Comment at 29-30.
See Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 33 U. CH. L. REV. 681 (1966).
E.g., Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608 (1952) (creation by
husband of a joint interest with rights of survivorship in the name of the
husband and a third person cannot be attacked by surviving wife because
it is not illusory).
For example, the surviving spouse under ordinary rules could elect a
forced share even though a life insurance policy on the decedent in favor
of the surviving spouse more than equaled the share intended to be
protected.
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the issue is between having a non-revolutionary protective
device which minimizes circumvention of policy by either
spouse or a device, such as typically exists presently, which
encourages circumvention or one which would be significantly
revolutionary to the forced share system for spousal protection.2 " The Code's technique is clearly the middle ground and
one can hardly criticize it when its intent is to encourage adoption and therefore uniformity." 5
Besides the significant substantive differences between
the Code and Wyoming law, there are several procedural variations which deserve mention. The surviving spouse has six
months to petition the court for his elective share; however,
the judge may extend for cause shown.2"' The demand for the
elective share may be withdrawn by the surviving spouse any
time before entry of a final determination. 0 7 In addition, the
right of election is personal to the surviving spouse and cannot
be exercised by anyone else or after the surviving spouse's
death except the court may exercise the election when the surviving spouse is incompetent and it is necessary to provide
adequate support for him during his probable life expectancy."' Antenuptial and postnuptial waivers are also specifically recognized so long as they are in writing and after a
fair disclosure. 0 '
Many of the above Code provisions are designed to discourage or restrict a surviving spouse from petitioning for
the election. In addition, they will encourage persons concerned about potential election problems to seek counseling.
A related problem concerns the spouse who is omitted
from a will because the marriage to the testator occurred
after the execution of the will. Wyoming law does not protect the omitted spouse other than to give him the forced share
option.21 The Code, on the other hand, treats it as a separate
204. For example, the civil law legitime concept. See generally, Haskell, The
Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 499 (1964).
205. New York and Oregon enacted modified versions of this approach. N.Y.
(McKinney 1967, Supp. 1971);
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1(b)
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 114.105, 114.125 (Repl. 1969). But see Zartman, An
Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413, 420-23.
206. U.P.C. § 2-205(a).
207. U.P.C. 2-205(c).
208. U.P.C. § 2-203.
209. U.P.C. § 2-204.
210. But see text infra pp. 209-10.
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situation. It provides that the "omitted spouse" may take
her intestate share as if the testator had died without a will. 1'
If the will indicates that the omission is intentional or if the
surviving spouse was intentionally provided for by transfers
in lieu of testamentary provisions, the above provision does
not apply. 12 The drafters justify this provision on the
grounds that this is what the testator probably would have
wanted and it will have the benefit of reducing elections
against the will.213 Unfortunately, a qualified omitted spouse
taking the automatic intestate share from the estate would
disrupt the estate as much as an election to take forced share
would. In addition, the elective share's limitations are not
present and more serious proof problems of intent are. The
necessity of this provision is debatable.214
B. Pretermitted Children
Except in Louisiana no other state has an actual forced
kinship statute in favor of descendants.. and consequently
one may, if he desires, even disinherit his children. A typical
provision which is prevalent, however, is the one for the pretermitted descendant.216 The general idea behind such provisions is that it is presumed the testator did not intend to disinherit the descendant omitted in he will. There are many
variations, however, which differ as to whom, when and how
the provisions are to be applied.
Wyoming is the only state which does not have some
form of pretermitted heir provision " 7 and the Wyoming Supreme Court has very strictly applied the absence of such a
provision. ' These facts have caused some planning problems
when the intent of the testator is to include after born children. The use of class gifts has been the most frequently used
device.
211. U.P.C.

§ 2-301.

212. Id.
213. Id., Comment at 39.
214. This section of the Code was added after the publication of the Fifth
215.

Working Draft. U.P.C., FIFTH WORKING DRAFT.
ATKINSON, WILLS § 36, at 138-39 (2d ed. 1953). This problem is sometimes

partially covered by the homestead, exempt property and family allowance
provisions. See supra pp. 191-95.
216. Id. at 141.
217. Id.
218. In re Ray's Estate, 287 P.2d 629 (Wyo. 1955); Burns v. Burns, 224 P.2d
178 (Wyo. 1950).
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The Code on the other hand, provides for pretermitted
descendants under the following prescribed requirements :219
(1) one must be a child of the testator; (2) the child must be
born or adopted after the execution of the testator's will; (3)
the terms of the will must not show an intentional omission;
(4) the other parent of the omitted child must not have been
devised substantially all of the estate in a will executed when
other children of the marriage were living;... and (5)

the

child must not have received outside of the will transfers intended by the testator to be in lieu of a testamentary provision.221 If these conditions are met the omitted child receives
the share in the estate to which he would have been entitled
had the testator died intestate. The section also provides an
intestate share for the child who is omitted because the testator believes him to be dead.222 The general abatement section
of the Code is applicable to this section."2
Although interpretation problems 2 4 will still exist
under the Code's provision for pretermitted heirs, it basically
adequately covers the who, when and how of the situation. The
limitations on the application of the provision should greatly
reduce the number of times it is employed and should avoid
most of the situations where injustices resulted under other
similar laws. Considering the injustices and the increase of
will contests which can arise without such a provision, when
all things are balanced this provision should be recommended.
219. U.P.C. § 2-302 (a).
220. This provision is to prevent unfair results when children born prior to
the execution are omitted and cannot take under the statute, but those
in the same family who were born after the execution can. See MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 41(a) and Comment at 76-77.
221. This provision liberalizes the extrinsic evidence rule in comparison to the
rules applied to advancements and ademption by satisfaction. See U.P.C.
§§ 2-110, 2-612. The reason given for this is that it is not inconsistent
because there is no provision in the will for the omitted child. U.P.C.
§ 2-302, Comment at 40.
222. U.P.C. § 2-302(b).
223. U.P.C. §§ 2-302(c), 3-902.
224. For example, what is sufficient to constitute an intentional omission on
the face of the will? The Comment states that a simple recital that the
testator intends to make no provision for the prospective child is sufficient.
U.P.C. § 2-302, Comment at 40. Language, which is not so specific, however, may cause courts some difficulty.
Another problem which might appear is when the claimant is the
descendant of the omitted child. The Code states that the section applies
only to "children" which according to its definition does not include grandchildren. U.P.C. §§ 1-201(3), 2-109. Under a provision similarly limited,
however, one court held that a grandchild in the situation described could
take. In re Horst, 264 N.Y. 236, 190 N.E. 475 (1934). Considering the sympathies which will obviously run in the grandchild's favor, the Code's limitation may find it will have to bend,
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203

EXECUTION, REVOCATION AND RELATED CONCEPTS

A. Execution
The basic instrument for distribution of wealth upon
death is the ordinary22 5 will. All fifty states have legislation
recognizing this type of instrument and specify the required
formalities which must be followed in order to execute a valid
one. Generally those formalities derive their existence from
the English Statute of Frauds of 1677 or Wills Act of 1837 or
a combination of both.2 2 The Wyoming2 2 and Code"' provisions are not exceptions in that they draw most of their
content from the Statute of Frauds.
The general comparison of the two pieces of legislation
is that they are simple in approach although the Code provides
more detail on some formalities for purposes of clarification.
The similarities between the two laws are numerous. They
both require: (1) a writing;... (2) the testator's signature
or a proxy signature in his presence and by his direction; (3)
two witnesses; (4) the witnesses must be competent at the
time of witnessing;2 ° and (5) the testator must be of sound
mind. They both do not require :231 (1) a signing at the end of
the will; (2) the witnesses to sign in the testator's presence;
(3) the witnesses to sign in each other's presence; or (4) a
statement in all cases by the testator that he publishes this
document as his will.
The Code covers two particular areas on which the Wyoming statute is silent. First, the Code specifically requires that
the witnesses sign the will. Although the Wyoming statute
is silent on this point, presumably it is a requirement in Wyo225. This word is intended to exclude holographic, nuncupative and other special
types of wills.
226. Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 614 (1960).
227. Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-47, -50 (1957 and Supp. 1971).
228. U.P.C. §§ 2-501, -502, -505.
229. Although Wyoming's statute specifically provides that a "writing" includes
"typewritten," it would seem to be the law regardless of the word's inclusion. Rees, supra note 226, at 615.
230. No age requirement is set in either the Code or under Wyoming law. See
U.P.C. § 2-505 (a); WYO. STAT. § 2-50 (1957) ; cf. WYo. STAT. § 1-138 (1957).
231. These points are important because although strict compliance with the
formalities required by the statute is necessary, no additional ones are.
ATKINSON, WILLS § 62, at 293 (2d ed. 1953).
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ring.25 2 Second, the Code has the broadest rule with regard
to the attestation requirement providing that the witnesses
must witness "either the signing or the testator's acknowledgment of the signature or of the will. "' Wyoming would seemingly require some form of attestation but its exact content
is unknown. There is generally no difficulty when the signing and witnessing occurs all in the presence of each other.2" 4
As stated above, however, this joint presence is not a requirement, and therefore some form of acknowledgment may be
necessary. A mere signing by the witness would not seem sufficient because an acknowledgment that the instrument is the
will of the testator or that the signature is that of the testator
is an implied necessity."3 5 Probably either one is sufficient.
The lack of any case law on this question indicates that there
has been little if any problem with it. Notwithstanding a
more specific statement such as is in the Code of what the
witnesses are to do is certainly preferred.
In one specific area, the Code and the Wyoming statute
presently differ. The Code states that a person eighteen years
or older may make a will.23 5 The Wyoming law uses the description "Any person of full age""' and at common law this
phrase meant that all persons who make a will must be twentyone years of age or more.2"' Until a statute changes this judicial rule it will remain in effect in Wyoming. 3 9
Another problem of competence concerns whether a person who receives an interest from a will is competent to witness it. The Wyoming statute provides that no witness can
derive "any benefit" from the will unless two other competent and disinterested witnesses have also witnessed it.2 40 A
232. See Merrill v. State, 21 Wyo. 421, 133 P. 134 (1913); In re Stringer's
Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 423-24, 343 P.2d 508, 522 (1959). In addition, the
second sentence of section 2-50 uses the words "subscribing witness" with
reference to the problem of interest of the witnesses; therefore, a signing
by the witnesses as a requirement can be readily inferred. WYO. STAT. § 2-50
(1957).
233. U.P.C. § 2-502.
234. ATKINSON, supra note 231, § 66, at 322.
235. Id. § 66, at 321.
236. U.P.C. § 2-501.
237. WYo. STAT. § 2-47 (1957).
238. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 224, (3d ed. 1959).
239. But see ch. 247, § 139 [1971] Wyo. Sess. Laws (age of "majority" is
changed to eighteen). Section 141, however, does not make the section
effective until January 1, 1973 and only if the state constitutional amendment giving eighteen year olds the right to vote is adopted by the voters.
Ch. 247, § 141 [1971] Wyo. Sess. Laws.
240. WYO. STAT. § 2-50 (1957).
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proviso states that the interested witness if also an heir may
receive such intestate share up to the amount devised in the
will. The apparent meaning of these provisions is to make the
interested person competent as a witness but in doing so, to
take away the interest so as to remove the temptation and inference of undue influence. 4 '
The Code completely removes the question of interest from
consideration. Not only does an interested person not invalidate a will but also he may take the gift provided in the will
regardless of any right to an intestate share.2 ' The Code
leaves the question of undue influence to a direct attack on
this basis in a will contest. No encouragement to use interested witnesses is intended, however. The section's avowed
purpose is to prevent injustices which occasionally have
occurred.2 4
The special holographic 4 4 will is recognized under both
Wyoming's law and the Code. Although only twenty-two
states recognize holographic wills,24 5 it would seem that a
continuation of the concept is advisable. The modern policy
with respect to wills is to increase recognition and many of
the old fears with regard to fraud and undue influence have
either not materialized or are not relevant today. In any case,
the holographic approach satisfactorily protects a person
from these dangers. Forgery, particularly when there is a
substantial exhibit of one's handwriting, is nearly impossible
and undue influence or duress would be more unlikely when
one has written the dispositive provision in his own hand than
when an ordinary will could be produced by another and need
only be signed and witnessed.
The Wyoming holographic provision has only two requirements: it must be (1) entirely written and (2) signed
by the hand of the testator himself.2 46 The Code retains
basically these two requirements but modifies the first one
241. See Harris v. Schoonmaker, 50 Wyo. 119, 143, 58 P.2d 415, 423 (1936),
rehearing denied, 50 Wyo. 143, 60 P.2d 360; WYo. STAT. §§ 1-138, -140
(1957).
242. U.P.C. § 2-505(b).
243. U.P.C. § 2-505, Comment at 49.
244. Typically defined as a will which is wholly in the testator's handwriting.
ATKINSON, WILLS . 75 (2d ed. 1953).
245. Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 613, 634-35 (1960).
246. Wyo. STAT. § 2-55 (1957).
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from "entirely written" to "material provisions are in the
handwriting. 2 4 7 This modification has a definite purpose
because of strict statutory construction applied by some courts
to the words "entirely written..'.. These courts have held
holographic wills invalid which contain any printed matter
on its face if the testator intended that matter to be a part of
the will. The "material provisions" language would permit,
on the other hand, a holding of validation to a holographic
will which was executed on a printed will form if the printed
portions could be eliminated and if the handwritten portions
would still adequately describe the testator's testamentary
scheme." '
Neither Wyoming nor the Code requires, as do many holographic statutes, that the will be dated."' Nor do they prescribe the place where the signature must be located. The primary problem in situations when there is no date or when the
signature is in an unusual place or both these facts are present
is whether the person intended the instrument to be his will
or nothing more than a statement of what he would do if he
executed a will. This is, of course, an evidentiary and not a
formality problem.
Neither statutory system provides for any recognition of
nuncupative or oral wills." 1 Considering the very limited
application or such wills, their nebulous, difficult of proof
character and their tendency to encourage litigation, the absence of such provisions is surely justified.
The Code adds a new type of special will. This will is
called the self-proved will.'5 Basically it is an ordinary
will which includes a notarized affidavit executed by the
testator and two witnesses. The form for the affidavit is
given in the Code and it is similar to the technique of attestation clauses typically included in wills today in that it prescribes the formalities and facts which were followed and
observed during execution. The effect of executing a self247. U.P.C.

2-503.

248.
249.
250.
251.

See ATKINSON, WILLS § 75, at 357-58 (2d ed. 1953).
U.P.C. § 2-503, Comment at 47. See also ATKINSON, supra note 244, at 358.
See Rees, supra note 245, at 635.
Merrill v. State, 21 Wyo. 421, 133 P. 134 (1913); U.P.C. §§ 2-502 to -504.
See generally Rees, supra note 245, at 636-39.
252., U,P.C. § 2-504.
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proved will is not very significant, however. Its principal
distinguishing feature is to permit the will to be admitted to
probate in a formal testacy proceeding without the necessity
of testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses.2 5 In most
other respects it is subject to the same treatment." '
Wyoming has a section which can achieve nearly the
same result. It permits a will to be admitted to probate on the
affidavit of one subscribing witness when no person appears
to contest it." 5 The content of the affidavit must indicate
that the will was executed in the manner required for an ordinary will and state that the testator was of sound mind at the
time of the execution. 56 It would not seem improper to execute such an affidavit for one or more of the witnesses at the
time of execution for purposes of retaining it and taking advantage of this section's procedural shortcut. It would be
very difficult to state and mostly a matter of opinion whether
the Code's or Wyoming's provision is superior.
In a mobile society such as we presently live in, the question of the validity of wills executed under the laws of other
states, nations or countries becomes an important consideration. The question is that when the decedent has a will executed according to another jurisdiction's law, "is it valid in
the state of probate?." The Code expressly deals with the
problem. It provides under the heading "Choice of Law as
to Execution" that a written will is valid if executed in compliance with the law of any of the following jurisdictions:
(1) the forum or probate state; (2) the state where executed;
or (3) the testator's state of domicile, place of abode or nationality if different from place of execution." 7 The rationale
behind this provision is to satisfy as far as possible a testator's
expectations with respect to the validity of his will.
Wyoming has similar rules with respect to wills previously probated in another state.5 8 This does not cover the
same problem, however. The Code provision anticipates a
domiciliary administration of the foreign executed will under
253. U.P.C. § 3-405.
254. See U.P.C. § 3-406(b).
255. WYo. STAT. § 2-66 (1957).
256. Id.
257. U.P.C. § 2-506.
258. Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-67 to -71 (1957).
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its law whereas the Wyoming Act anticipates an ancillary
administration of an estate already being administered in the
state of the decedent's domicile. Consequently, the Wyoming
Act does not adequately provide for the most common Conflict of Laws problem. Since different procedures still exist
for the execution of wills, the liberal choice of law provision of
the Code is clearly the better rule.259
B. Revocation
A characteristic of the will concept is the power of the
testator to revoke."' The three generally accepted methods
are: (1) by physical act; (2) by subsequent instrument, and
(3) by operation of law due to changed circumstances.2"'
Statutes of all states adopt these methods in differing degrees.
With respect to revocation by physical act, Wyoming followed the Statute of Frauds language providing that a will
may be physically revoked by "burning, tearing, cancelling
or obliterating."2 2 Partial revocation by a physical act is apparently possible under the statute, too.26 5 Generally, the specified methods have been interpreted to require some form of
physical evidence of revocation on the will itself but not to require total destruction.2 6 4 Courts have often, however, refused
to find a will physically revoked on very technical grounds." 5
The rationale is that physical revocation is inherently ambiguous because it fails to indicate the actual intent of the testator; therefore, a strict construction on physical revocation
methods is a necessity to prevent fraud by third persons who
happen to obtain possession of the will.20 0
259. See generally, Rees, supra note 245, at 905-07. The Comment on this section
of the Code points out that if the Code is widely adopted by our fifty
states, "the impact of this section will become minimal." U.P.C. § 2-506,
Comment at 50.
260. 1 BowE & PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 5.17 (3d rev. ed. 1960).
261. ATKINSON, WILLS § 84 (2d ed. 1953). The first two methods require three
principal elements: (1) an authorized act or instrument; (2) an intent on
the part of the testator to revoke; and (3) a testator possessing legal
capacity at the time of the revocation. The "by operation of law" method
does not necessarily include these elements but actually represents a finding
of a presumed intent on the part of the testator due to the changed
circumstances.
262. WYO. STAT. § 2-51 (1957).
263. ATKINSON, supra note 261, § 86, at 444.
264. Id. § 86.
265. E.g., Thompson v. Royall, 163 Va. 492, 175 S.E. 748 (1934).
266. See ScoLEs & HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES

ANP T.RVSTS 142 (1965).
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Revocation by subsequent instrument is also permitted
by the statute if accomplished by an instrument executed
with the same formalities as any valid will.267 One of the
primary problems with this type of revocation is whether a
prior will can be revoked impliedly by a subsequent written
will which is inconsistent with the prior will or whether the
former will is merely superseded by the latter will. This point
is important in determining the question of a subsequent revocation of the latter will. If the subsequent will merely superseded the prior will, a total revocation of the later will will
apparently reinstate the former will's provisions whereas if
the former is actually considered to be revoked, the concept of
revival, with all of its own rules and problems, will apply. 6 '
There is a body of case law on the problem in other jurisdiction ;29 however, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not decided
the issue.
At common law, revocation by operation of law was recognized in two situations: a single woman's will was revoked
when she subsequently married and a single man's will was
revoked after his marriage and birth of an issue.27 No other
change of circumstances would revoke a will by operation of
law. It was apparently with these circumstances in mind
that several states, including Wyoming, adopted a provision
in their revocation statute which basically provided that the
expressed methods of revocation in the statute do not "prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes
in the condition or circumstances of the testator.".2 . Obviously, this provision leaves an element of uncertainty with
respect to the validity of a will which would otherwise be
valid under all other ordinary circumstances.
Since the phrase does not specify what changes in circumstances will cause a revocation, the courts are left the power
to determine its scope on a case by case basis. The Wyoming
267. WYO. STAT. § 2-51 (1957). See also In re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389,
402-03, 343 P.2d 508, 512 (1959). Although the phraseology of the provision
could be interpreted inversely, an holographic will would apparently be a
proper revoking instrument.
268. See text infra pp. 211-12.

269. See generally 2 BowE & PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 21.43 (3d rev. ed. 1960);
ATKINSON, WILLS § 87, at 450-52 (2d ed. 1953).

270.
271.

ATKINSON, supra note 269, § 85.
See Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L.
WYO. STAr. § 2-51 (1957).

REV. 856, 880-81 (1960).
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Supreme Court has taken four opportunities to explore this
problem. 72 In the first case it held that a man's will was revoked by operation of law when a chronology of the following
events occured: a marriage, a will executed, an annulment
granted, a property settlement rendered, and a subsequent
marriage.2 7 Although this situation was not recognized by
early common law decisions, many courts today hold the same
way under similar circumstances." 4 In the second case the
court correctly reversed the outdated common law rule that
an unmarried woman's will is revoked upon her marriage."'
In the third case, the court followed the common law and held
that a man's will executed after his marriage is not revoked
by the birth of a subsequent issue. 7 ' The fourth case concerned a modification of the first one. The Supreme Court
held that a pro forma divorce unaccompanied by adequate
proof of a property settlement does not constitute a per se
revocation of the husbands' will. 77 This is the present status
of the rules of revocation by operation of law in Wyoming.
It does not, however, answer whether the second common law
exception would be recognized and leaves open to doubt
whether divorce and property settlement without a remarriage would revoke a decedent's will by operation of law. 7 8
The Code is not intended to materially alter many of the
above rules on revocation of wills, but it does attempt to provide answers for some of the questions left unanswered. All
three methods are in one form or another approved.7 9 With
regard to physical revocation, the Code merely adds the word
"destroyed" to the list of conduct sufficient to revoke a will.
In addition, the subsequent properly executed instrument is
a proper method to revoke a prior will. This subsequent instrument may accomplish a revocation either expressly or by
272. See Note, 10 Wyo. L.J. 112 (1956).
273. Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 52 P.2d 1219 (1935).
274. See generally ATKINSON, supra note 269, § 85, at 431-32.
REV. STAT. § 112.315 (Repl. 1969).
275.

See also OaE.

Naab v. Smith, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940).

276. Burns v. Burns, 67 Wyo. 314, 224 P.2d 178 (1950). See also In re Ray's
Estate, 287 P.2d 629 (Wyo. 1955).
277. In re Hoevet's Estate, 436 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1968). Other relevant facts in
the case were that there had been a transfer by quit claim deed from the
husband to the wife and the couple had continued to live together after
the divorce.
278. But cf. id.
279. U.P.C. § 2-508.
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inconsistency. Under both these methods, a partial revocation
is recognized.

Taking the modern approach to revocation by operation
of law, the Code recognizes revocation of any disposition or
appointment of property made by a will to a person to which
the testator is no longer married. The Code section is very
explicit with respect to the scope and limitations of this situation. 8 " In addition, the provision specifically states that no
other change of circumstance shall be deemed to revoke a will
by operation of law. Considering the other protections provided in the Code for omitted or pretermitted spouses and
children, abolishing the old common law rules on revocation
by operation of law is justified.
C. Revival of Revoked Wills
A related and recurring problem with respect to revocation is the matter of revival of revoked wills. The best way to

pursue this discussion is to state an example of the problem:
by subsequent instrument the testator revokes a prior will;
later, the testator revokes the second will and the question, of
course, is, "is the first will revived?" A significant amount of
judicial and legislative time has been relegated to determining
the answer to this question. ' Wyoming has been no exception
to this endeavor. In reference to a situation similar to that
described above, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated "the
question of revival is one of pure intention, without there
being any presumption either for or against revival arising
by virtue of the destruction of the revocatory will.". 82 The
Court rejected the two other recognized approaches to this
problem, i.e., revival as a matter of law upon revocation of
revoking instrument and revival only by re-execution or republication. 8' Unfortunately, the court did not indicate the
type of evidence which could be used to prove the intent of
the testator. For example, would statements by the testator
expressing an intent to revive at the time of the revocation of
280. Divorce and annulment are defined by U.P.C. § 2-802 (b).
281.

ATKINSON, WILLS § 92 (2d ed. 1953).

282. In re Wilson's Estate, 397 P.2d 805, 809 (Wyo. 1964) construing, In re
Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508, modified, 80 Wyo. 426, 345
P.2d 786 (1959) (emphasis by the court).
283. See Comment, 19 Wyo. L.J. 223 (1965).
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the second instrument be admitted into evidence to prove this
question of intent ?
Wyoming also apparently recognizes the revival by codicil concept. The typical example for this rule to apply is as
follows: Will #1 is validly executed; Will #1 is revoked by
valid Will #2; valid Will or Codicil #3 revokes Will #2 and
states that Will #1 is revalidated. The Wyoming Supreme
Court held that the revoked will was revalidated if the testator
indicated an intent to so revive the revoked will and if the revoked will was sufficiently described." 4
The Code deals specifically with both these problems.
With respect to the first example, the physical revocation of
the second will does not revive the first will unless it is evident from the circumstances of the revocation of the latter
will or from contemporary or subsequent declarations by the
testator that he intended to revive the first will.2 5' The Comment indicates that statements by the testator concerning his
intent can be admitted."' With respect to revival by a third
will, it is required that the terms of the third will indicate
that the testator intended that the first will be revived.28 7
Although not mentioned in the provision, it must be presumed
that the third will must adequately describe the first will in
order to revive it. In other words, the Code would with a few
additional clarifications legislatively recognize Wyoming's
present rules on these matters.2 8
284. In re Wilson's Estate, 397 P.2d 805, 808-09 (Wyo. 1964).
285. U.P.C. § 2-509(a). This aspect of the Code's revival provision was not
adopted by Maryland and Oregon: both states require republication in some
manner of the prior will. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 4-106 (Repl. 1969);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 112.295 (Repl. 1969).
286. U.P.C. § 2-509, Comment at 52.
287. U.P.C § 2-509(b).
288. The related common law concept of dependent relative revocation deals with
the question of revival although it is also related to the problem of mistake
of law or fact on the part of the testator. See generally, ATKINSON, WILLS
§ 88 (2d ed. 1953); Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARv. L.
REV. 337 (1920); 57 AM. JuR. WILLS §§ 514-20 (1948). The basic idea of
the concept is that if a testator physically revokes a will or a part thereof
with the immediate present intent of making a new will or altering a part
thereof as a substitute and if the new will or alteration is not made or fails
of effect for any reason, many courts have presumed that the testator
would have preferred the old will or its provision than he would have
intestacy. Consequently, the old will or its provisions if its contents can
be ascertained, have been admitted to probate in absence of evidence overcoming this presumption. Because of the inherent ambiguity of a physical
revocation, parol and extrinsic evidence has been readily admitted to
clarify the nature of the intent or in other words to permit the showing of
the mistake upon which the intent is founded. This approach has been
taken even though the same courts have usually refused to correct or to
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D. Lost and Destroyed Wills
Another problem which is related to revocation is that
concerned with lost and destroyed wills. The general rule has
been that in absence of statute, lost and destroyed wills may
be admitted to probate upon adequate proof of their contents
and due executions." 9 If such proof cannot be maintained or
if a statute restricts the proof of such wills, in a sense the lost
or destroyed will has been revoked. Many states, including
Wyoming, have statutes which specifically apply to the probate of such wills.29 A typical provision which is found in
some of these statutes is that the lost or destroyed will cannot
be probated unless it is "proved to have been in existence at
the time of the death of the testator, or is shown to have been
291
fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator.'

This statement of timing has caused problems in situations
where the will was lost or destroyed during the testator's lifetime but not by him, by his authority or fraudulently by
another person. According to the literal language of the
quoted phrase, such a will cannot be probated and therefore it
has been revoked by a means not approved by the revocation
statute. Since Wyoming has a statute which includes the
quoted phrase, the situation could arise in this state.292
In order to avoid such an unintended revocation, some
courts have interpreted the phrase "fraudulently destroyed
in his lifetime" as intended to require proof that either the
will had not been destroyed during the testator's lifetime or
that, if destroyed during his lifetime, it had not been destroyed
by him or by his authority ;.. or have interpreted the phrase

"in existence at the time of death" as referring to legal exiseven receive evidence of other types of mistakes. ATKINSON, supra § 58.
Dependent relative revocation may also be employed when the "conditional"
revocation is by a subsequent instrument but in this situation the mistake
must appear on the face of the revoking instrument. ATKINSON, supra § 88,
at 459.
Neither Wyoming law nor the Code specifically provides for the use
of such a doctrine, although the Code in a comment does make affirmative
reference to the doctrine. U.P.C. § 2-507, Comment at 50. It is probably
wise not to have specific legislation on this concept since such legislation
would unnecessarily constrict an extremely useful and flexible device.
289. ATKINSON, WILLS § 97 (2d ed. 1953).
290. See generally, Ferrier, Statutory Restrictions on Probate of Lost Wills:
Judicial Inroads on Restrictions, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1944).
291. See ATKINSON, supra note 289, § 97, at 507.

292. WYO.STAT. § 2-73 (1957). See generally WYO. STAT. §§ 2-72 to -75 (1957).
293. E.g., In re Fox's Will, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 174 NE.2d 499 (1961).
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tence rather than physical existence. 29" Although these interpretations have achieved just results in the individual cases,
they are direct affronts to the literal language of the statutes.
Apparently using the Model Probate Code as a guide,2 95
the Code contains no special limitation on the probate of a
lost or destroyed will other than to require that such will be
probated in a "Formal Testacy" proceeding.2 9 The apparent
rationale is that specific guidelines create a rigidity which
will prevent appropriate adaptation in all cases; therefore
the matter is felt to be best left to the procedural rules and
regulations of the probate proceeding itself.29
VII.

MISCELLANEOUS RELATED CONCEPTS

A. Incorporation by Reference
The majority of American jurisdictions recognize the
concept that an unexecuted document or instrument may be
incorporated for specific purposes into a valid properly executed will.2 9 In order to avoid an obvious possibility of fraud,
limitations have been imposed upon the use of this doctrine.
Generally, six requirements have been recognized as a necessity
for the doctrine's application: (1) a validly executed will;
(2) a distinct reference to the unexecuted document in the
will itself; (3) a showing or statement in the will that the
document is in existence at the time the will is executed; (4)
proof that the document was actually in existence at the time
of execution; (5) a showing of intent on the part of the testator to incorporate the document into the will; and, (6) a showing that the document offered is the one referred to in the
will. 9 The Courts have more or less adhered to the above requirements. For example requirements numbers 1 and 4
have been strictly adhered to whereas numbers 2 and 5 have
sometimes been liberally applied."'
294. E.g., In re Havel's Estate, 156 Minn. 253, 194 N.W. 633 (1923).
295. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 65(e).
296. U.P.C. § 3-402(b).
297. MODEL PROBATE CODE at 20.
298. 2 BowE & PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 19.17 (3d rev. ed. 1960).
299. See id. § 19.18.
300. See ScOLEs & HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
AND TRUSTS 120-23 (1965).
Another question which can arise even where the doctrine is
is whether the incorporated document becomes a "physical" part of
If it does then two further questions may have to be asked: Would
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Although apparently recognized," ° ' there has been no full
exposition of the limitations and regulations of the incorporation by reference doctrine in Wyoming. The Code, however,
specifically and wisely provides for recognition of the doctrine. Basically the Code requires all of the six requirements
be satisfied before the doctrine is applied."'2 Obviously how
strictly each requirement would be adhered to must wait for
court determinations.
Both Wyoming and the Code have special provisions with
respect to will "pour over" provisions into existing inter

vivos trusts. These provisions are a recognition of a typical
estate planning device which permits a testator to bequeath
or devise a part of his estate to an existing inter vivos trust
even though the trust is not executed with the formalities of
a will and even though the trust is amendable and actually
amended subsequent to the execution of the testator's will."'
Because such amendments or alterations are recognized, this
concept obviously goes further than the incorporation by reference doctrine which requires that the writing referred to
be complete and in existence when the will is executed.
Whereas the Wyoming legislature enacted.. 4 what is referred to as the shorter Illinois Pour Over Statute,0 5 the
Code3"6 employs Section 1 of the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act. The latter provision is considered to be
an improved version of the Illinois Act in that it covers problems such as: (1) where the trust is an unfunded life insurance trust with no substantial interest; (2) when the trust is
executed concurrently with the will but not necessarily before
the will; (3) when the trust is included within a valid will of
another person who has predeceased the testator; (4) whether
the inter vivos trust is made into a testamentary trust by the
pour over provision; (5) whether if the will so provides,

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

vivos trust incorporated into a will thereby become a testamentary trust
and, can an holographic will incorporate a non-holographic instrument?"
Cf. Id. at 123.
Cf. In r'eNelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. 444, 475-76, 266 P.2d 238, 250 (1954).
See also 15 Wyo. L.J. 58 (1960); WYo. STAT. § 34-94 (1957) (incorporation
of prior instruments for purposes of charitable bequests).
U.P.C. § 2-510.
See generally 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 54-54.3 (3d ed. 1967).
WYO. STAT. § 2-53 (1957).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 43(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
U.P.C. § 2-511.
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amendments to the trust made after the testator's death are
permitted, and (6) whether revocation or termination of the
trust causes the pour over provision to lapse. Wyoming
would be well advised to consider the adoption of this provision rather than the one which it presently has.
B. Facts of Independent Significance
One concept of wills which is typically not codified into
law but which is an absolute necessity to the proper functioning of our testamentary law is the doctrine of independent
significance. This doctrine is universally recognized in the
common law and generally permits certain evidence outside of
the will to be admitted in order to determine who receives and
what property passes under the testator's will." 7 The general
statement of the rule is that if a fact, be it an act or event,
has significance other than to pass property at death, this significance entitles that fact to control the disposition of the
property. This rule applies regardless of whether the testator or other third persons can affect the act or event subsequent to the will's execution. 8 Typical examples of the use
of the doctrine of facts of independent significance are the
common use in wills of such words as "children," "cousins,"
"brothers and sisters," the "residue" and "all my property."
In order to determine the meaning of each of those words, it
is necessary to look at facts outside the face of the will but
since these words have an obvious significance other than to
pass property at death, the court permits extrinsic evidence
to show the meaning of the words.
The drafters of the Code felt that the doctrine is important enough to necessitate a specific statement of the rule.
The relevant provision is a broad statement of the common law
rule applicable to acts or events which occur before or after the
execution of the will or after the testator's death."' In addition, it separates and makes a specific statement recognizing
and validating a reference to the execution or revocation of
another's will."' Although there is general common law recog307. See generally 2 BowE & PARKER, PACE ON WILLS § 19.34 (3d rev. ed. 1960).

308. ATKINSON, WILLS § 81 (2d ed. 1953).
309. U.P.C. § 2-512.
810. Id. See generally ATKINSON, supra, note 308, § 81, at 398-99; 1 ScoTt,
TRUSTS § 54.4 (3d ed. 1967).
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nition of this concept, a specific deliniation of the rule and its
scope is meritorious.
The Code also adds a new device to the incorporation by
reference and facts of independent significance doctrines.
By an instrument either in his handwriting or signed by
hand and referred to in his will, a testator is permitted to
dispose of certain tangible personal property regardless of
whether the writing is in existence before or after the execution of the will or of whether it is actually altered by the
testator after the execution of the will."' The Comment states
that this provision is justified because it is in line with the
policies of effectuating a testator's intent and of relaxing
formalities of execution."' Apparently the belief is that considering the limitations upon the type and extent of property
which can be disposed of in this manner, problems of fraud,
duress and undue influence are not serious considerations.
There is also the apparent feeling that a great many laymen,
particularly older people, desire such a provision. 1 Without
such a provision, the most feasible aternatives.. 4 are (1) to
create a revocable inter vivos trust of the personal property, or
(2) to give the property to a trusted friend outright with precatory words requesting the friend to distribute the personal
property according to a list which may be found with the will.
Unfortunately, a revocable inter vivos trust of personal
effects is cumbersome and an outright gift provides no
security that the property will be transferred to the desired
beneficiaries and could cause adverse inheritance tax problems.813 One of the most beneficial aspects of this Code's provision would be that a client who would otherwise require and
wish to change his will frequently will not have to contact
his attorney each time such an alteration is desired. Otherwise, the merit of having a special provision for these situations is not entirely clear.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

U.P.C. § 2-513. The provision would not permit one to dispose of "money,
evidences of indebtedness, documents of title, and securities, and property
used in trade or business" in this manner. Id.
Id., Comment at 54.
Cf. ScoLEs & HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 124 (1965).
The secret trust in a will device is another judicially recognized approach,
but its recognition is founded upon a defective theory. See 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§§ 55-55.1 (3d ed. 1967).
See WYO. STAT. §§ 2-337(c), -338 (Supp. 1971).
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VIII. CONSTRUCTIONAL AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS
PROBLEMS OF TESTAMENTARY DISTRIBUTION

Several problems in the law of decedents' estate, although
they also relate to the distribution and might fall under the
discussion of administration of an estate, are more relevant

to this section in that they materially affect the estate planning aspects of testamentary distribution and therefore deserve discussion in this part of the article. Whereas Wyoming
has statutory provisions on only a few of the problems, the
Code goes to significant lengths to codify most of them. "1 '
A. Choice of Law
The general rule with regard to the Conflict of Laws
problems dealing with construction of wills has ordinarily referred to the law of the testator's domicile for purposes of
determining the disposition of personal property and to the
law of the situs with regard to disposition of real property."'
By judicial decision Wyoming has followed this rule.31 The
Code, however, takes a modem approach8 1" to this problem
by permitting the testator to determine what local law shall
be applied in construing the disposition of his property provided that the selected law is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum state.8 2 ° This concept is meritorious in that it
lines testamentary Conflict of Laws rules with what is generally permitted when dealing with inter vivos trusts. 2 ' It will,
therefore, carry out one of the purposes of the Code by encouraging the use of the will device for the disposition of
property.
B. After-Acquired Property
Both Wyoming.82 and the Code. have a provision providing that a testator's will may pass all of his property including property acquired after the date of the will's execu316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

The Code specifically provides that the rules are rules of construction and
are subject to an express contrary intent by the testator in the will itself.
U.P.C. § 2-603.
See generally LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 198 (1968).
In re Ray's Estate, 74 Wyo. 317, 287 P.2d 629 (1955).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT oF LAWS §§ 240, 264 (1971).
U.P.C. § 2-602.
See LEFLAR, supra note 317, at § 192.
WYo. STAT. § 2-49 (1957).
U.P.C. § 2-604.
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tion. The Wyoming statute requires that the intent to pass
after-acquired property must be manifested on the face of

the will. In practice, however, this additional requirement
would not alter the scope of the rule." ' This rule is a part
of the ambulatory concept of wills and is an absolute necessity
for modern estate planning.
C. Ademption by Extinction
Ademption by extinction is a common law rule of construction which holds that if a specifically bequeathed or
devised325 item of property is not a part of the testator's
estate at the time of his death, the devise or bequest fails."'
The Code, although it leaves much of this concept to determination by the court, attempts to deal with several of the
issues which have arisen with respect to interpretation of the
extent of the concept. Much of the litigation has concerned
specific bequests of securities to which there have been stock
splits or other changes or additions in form only. The Code
provides that the specific legatee is entitled to these splits,
additions or other changes in form which have been caused by
action initiated by the security entity. 27 Distributions such
as cash dividends declared prior to death, although paid after
death, are not part of the specific bequest, however.2 8
Another area of ademption with which the Code attempts
to answer is the situation where the specifically devised
property is sold by a conservator or a condemnation award
is granted or insurance proceed is paid for a loss of the propety to the conservator. The Code provides that the specific
legatee is entitled to a general pecuniary legacy equal to the
value of the property no longer in the conservator's posses324. Cf. U.P.C. § 2-603.
325. Since the rule in the text applies only to specific devises and bequests,
definitions of the various classes of testamentary gifts are important. And,
since the Code does not define these terms, the common law definitions are
applicable. A specific devise or bequest is a gift of a specific item or
portion of the estate. A general legacy or devise is a gift of a set value
or generally described property which is to be charged against the whole
estate and not a specific portion thereof. A demonstrative legacy is a gift
payable out of the whole estate but which is in the first place to be
charged against certain parts of the estate. Residuary gifts are gifts of
the remainder of the estate. See generally 6 BOWE & PARKER, PAGE ON
WILLS §§ 48.1-.10 (3d rev. ed. 1962).
326. ATKINSON, WILLS § 134 (2d ed. 1953).
327. U.P.C. § 2-607(a).
328. U.P.C. § 2-607(b).
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sion: if, however, the testator's disability ceases to exist for
The
a year prior to death this provision does not apply.2
rationale for these rules is to provide the specific legatee with
some form of protection from the acts of conservators which
unfairly affect his interests. Since the concept of ademption
is typically based upon the testator's actions, acts of a third
person should not materially and unfairly affect a specific
legatee's interest.3 3
A third source of controversy has centered around the
specific devisee's rights to assets which represent in part or
in whole the remaining interest which the testator retains in
the specifically devised property. The Code protects the
specific devisee by giving him a right to these assets in four
specified situations: (1) unpaid but owing balance of the
purchase price; (2) unpaid amounts of a condemnation
award; (3) unpaid fire or casualty insurance proceeds; and
(4) property received by foreclosure or obtained in lieu of
foreclosure on a specifically devised security."3 '
All of the above discussed issues have created litigation.
Consequently, the Code's attempt to clarify the rules is praiseworth.
D. Ademption by Satisfaction
The ademption by satisfaction concept is related to the
advancement concept under intestate distribution.3 2 It provides that a general or residuary bequest 3 . is adeemed in
whole or in part when a testator makes an inter vivos gift to
a legatee after the execution of the will."" As with advancements, the effect of the gift depends upon the testator's intent
and this, of course, is typically difficult to establish. 3" When
intent is not clearly manifested several factors have been considered relevant: (1) is the testator in loco parentis to the
legatee; (2) is the property transferred of the same nature
U.P.C. § 2-608(a).
Cf. MODEL PROBATE CODE § 23, Comment at 214.
U.P.C. § 2-608(b).
See text supra pp. 187-88.
See discussion supra note 325.
ATKINSON, supra note 326, at § 183. Of course, if a testator makes an inter
vivos gift of property specifically bequeathed or devised to the legatee or
devisee, the gift would be adeemed by extinction.
335. Id.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
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as that bequeathed; and (3) is the gift in the nature of a
"'portion" of the legacy."' 6 These factors have been used to
raise presumptions one way or the other of whether the testamentary gift is adeemed; however, they have not been employed with any substantial or significant degree of consistency.
It is with this apparently in mind, that the Code specifically limits the application of ademption by satisfaction.
Paralleling the provision on advancements, the Code provides
that an inter vivos gift to a person is to be treated as partial
or total satisfaction of a devise to that person only if there is
written evidence that the testator intended that it be so
treated.8 3 7 The written evidence may be manifested in the
will, in a contemporaneous writing or in an acknowledgement
in writing by the devisee. The Code alters its advancement
rule under similar circumstances... in that if a satisfaction
is intended, it applies to the devisee's kindred who take in
his place. Valuation is as of the date of possession, enjoyment
or death, whichever occurs first.
Considering the difficulty which courts have had with
respect to this common law concept, the specificity and limitations of the Code provision would be a meritorious addition
to the law of decedents' estate.
E. Abatement
The problem of abatement pervades a large area of the
law of decedents' estates. It can arise because the estate does
not have enough funds to satisfy all of the legacies, devises
or bequests due to creditors' claims, or to an election by the
spouse, pretermitted heirs, or to expenses of administration,
taxes or to an insufficiency of funds. The common law provided that in absence of a specific order indicated in the testators' will, the order of abatement for personal property was
as follows: (1) intestate property, (2) residuary legacies,
(3) general legacies, and (4) specific and demonstrative
legacies.3 9 Within each of the classes of testamentary gifts,
336.
337.
338.
339.

6 BOWE & PARKER, PACE ON WILLS §§ 54.28, .30, .33, .35, (3d rev. ed. 1962).
U.P.C. § 2-612.
U.P.C. § 2-110.
MODEL PROBATE CODE at 353.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1972

53

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 7 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 8

222

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VII

the assets would contribute and abate ratably. 4 ' Although
subject to specific statutory or judicial exceptions today,
real property was not liable for debts. 41
Subject to an express order of abatement in a testator's
will, 42 Wyoming has specific provisions for the abatement
caused by debts, expenses of administration and family expenses. Intestate property is to abate first.4 All other bequests and legacies be they of residuary, general, demonstrative or specific types, are to abate and contribute pro rata except that specific devises and apparently demonstrative legacies are to abate last if necessary to carry out the intent of the
testator. 44 There is no preference between real and personal
property.34 The Wyoming Supreme Court has held, however,
that when dealing with the problem of a spouse taking his
forced share, the judge of the probate court should disturb as
little as possible the testator's testamentary scheme thereby
leaving the order of abatement to the judge's discretion. 4
Unless the testator otherwise provides, the Code.47 follows the common law approach with three important exceptions. First, there is no preference between real and personal
property. 4 Second, the court, if it determines that an express
or implied purpose of the testamentary plan would be defeated
by following the ordinary order of abatement, may order that
the abatement be in the manner necessary to carry out the
testator's intent.4 9 Third, if the abatement problem is caused
by a surviving spouse electing against the will, the Code provides that all beneficiaries under the will are to suffer the
reduction pro rata."'0 These features of the Code are meritorious because they give discretion across the board to the court
with respect to general abatement problems and require all
beneficiaries of the will to suffer an equal loss due to an elec840.
341.
842.
843.
344.
845.
346.
347.
348.
349.
800,

Id.
Id.
WYo.STAT. § 2-282 (1957).
WYO. STAT. § 2-284 (1957).
WYO. STAT. §§ 2-297, -298 (1957). See also Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-336 to -346 (Supp. 1971).
WYO. STAT. § 2-248 (1957).
In re Dixon's Estate, 66 Wyo. 197, 218, 207 P.2d 510, 517 (1949).
U.P.C. § 3-902.
U.P.C. § 3-902(a).
U.P.C. § 3-902(b).
U.P.C. § 2-207.
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tion of a surviving spouse. These rules are more in line with
what a testator would probably actually desire if he had considered and taken care of the abatement problem in his will.
In addition, the usual estate planning practice of giving the
residue to the primary beneficiaries will not result after the
death of the testator with this class of testamentary gift suffering most of the abatement as the common law rule would
require.
F. Lapse
At common law when a legatee or devisee died between the
execution of the will and the death of the testator, the gift to
that person was held to lapse.85 ' If this beneficiary was dead
before the execution of the will, the gift was said to be void."5 2
These gifts would then pass into the residuary if any, but if
not or if the residuary was void or lapsed, they would pass in
intestacy. 3 Several methods have been used or developed to
avoid this problem, e.g., survivorship interests, class gifts and
the most recent development, the enactment of anti-lapse statutes. Generally, these statutes permit the descendants of certain classes of dead legatees to stand in the ancestors place
for purposes of taking under a testator's will." ' Wyoming is
among the few, if not the only state, which does not have an
anti-lapse statute. 55 Consequently, the common law doctrine
is apparently applicable in this state and in order to avoid the
problem the other two devices mentioned above are commonly
employed.
The Code contains a comprehensive package of constructional rules concerned with the problem of lapse. Paralleling its provision with respect to an heir surviving, all legatees and devisees are said to have predeceased the testator
unless they survive him by 120 hours."5 ' Although this increases the potential of death of devisees and legatees by five
days, protection is provided for all devisees who fall within
the class of being a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a
grandparent, i.e., issue of such persons are permitted to take
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

6 BOwE & PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 50.1 (3d rev. ed. 1962).
ATKINSON, WILLS § 140 (2d ed. 1953).
Id.
See Rees, American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 861-64 (1960).
ATKINSON, supra note 352, § 140, at 779.
U.P.C. § 2.601.
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in their ancestors place according to the Code's rule of representation. "' In addition, the anti-lapse provision specifically
applies to descendants of such devises under a class gift and
in all applicable cases regardless of whether the common law
would have said the gift was void or lapsed. The Comment
argues that this last rule is probably more in line with what
5 8 The common law
the testator would probably have desired."
rules of lapse, however, will still apply to legatees and devisees who do not fall within the class of covered persons. For
example, relatives related by marriage would not be protected
by the provision. This seems to be a reasonable limitation.
If lapse does occur, the Code has a specific section covering where the lapsed gift is to pass. If such a gift was other
than a residuary bequest, it becomes part of the residue." 9
If the residue is devised to two or more persons and one share
fails for any reason, that person's share passes to the other
residuary beneficiary or beneficiaries."' This is a meritorious
rule of construction in that it will avoid in many cases some
part of the estate passing in intestacy. Of course, if all of the
residuary beneficiaries fail, that part passing in the residue
will go into intestacy.
G. Succession Contracts
In order to reduce confusion and litigation in the administration of decedents' estates, the Code has proposed that the
rules be tightened with respect to the proof of contracts concerning succession, including contracts to make a will or not
to revoke a will or to die intestate. The Code provides that
such contracts can be established only by: (1) material provisions of the contract being stated in the will, (2) express
references in the will to such a contract and other extrinsic
evidence proving the terms of the contract, or (3) evidence
of the contract in writing signed by the decedent."6 1 This provision is not intended to otherwise alter the rules of evidence
with regard to the proof of such contracts. No presumption of
such a contract not to revoke a will can be created, however,
357.
858.
359.
360.
361,

U.P.C.
U.P.C.
U.P.C.
U.P.C.
UP.C.

§ 2-605. See U.P.C. § 2-106.
§ 2-605, Comment at 57.
§ 2-606(a).
§ 2-606(b).
§ 2-701. See Nichols v. Pangarova, 419 P.2d 688 (Wyo. 1966).
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by the mere execution of a joint will or mutual wills." The
stated reasons 3 ' for these rules would seem to be justified.
Considering that one of the parties to the contract is no longer
available to testify, it is good public policy to require some
form of written evidence that the contract actually existed.
H. Miscellaneous Code Provisions
The Code covers several other areas which deserve mention and with which present legislation typically does not
take into account. First, the right of exoneration of a mortgage on specifically devised real and personal property is
abolished regardless of a general directive in the will to pay
debts. 64 Although contrary to the common law and therefore
presumably the Wyoming rule, this provision is more in line
with modern philosophy 6 and practice since estate planners
have typically included such a provision in their client's wills.
Second, general residuary or general disposition of all property clauses are not to be interpreted as exercising a power of
of appointment held by the testator unless a specific reference
is made to the power or some other indication to include the
power is included within the will.' 66 This rule is also in line
with the modern estate planning practice of creating general
powers of appointment in marital deduction trusts with the
general idea that the surviving spouse will not exercise the
power. Again, estate planners ordinarily impose. the same restriction on donees in the donor's transferring instrument.
The third special provision concerns terms of status and
their use in testamentary instruments. The Code specifically
provides that the intestacy definitions for half-bloods, adopted
persons and illegitimates are to be employed for determining
members of a class mentioned in a will.36 T An illegitimate,
however, is not to be considered a child of the father unless the
father has openly and notoriously treated that person as a
child. These rules of construction are meritorious in that they
will hopefully prevent different definitions being given to
362. U.P.C. § 2-701. See Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 240 P. 927 (1925).
363. U.P.C. § 2-701, Comment at 61.
364. U.P.C. § 2-609.
365. See ATKINSON, WILLS § 127, at 707 (2d ed. 1953); MODEL PROBATE CODE
§ 189, Comment at 175.
366. U.P.C. § 2-610.
367. U.P.C. § 2-611.
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the same word depending on whether the issue arises in intestacy or in testacy.
A fourth provision deals with the postmortem planning
device of renunciation.3 68 Although the basic concept is probably universally recognized,"' there have been some unnecessary limitations and unclear areas with respect to it. The
Code, of course, attempts to correct these problems. It provides that a person or his personal representative may renounce in whole or in part any type of succession transfer. 7
This renunciation must be evidenced by a writing describing
the property or interest to be renounced, the extent of the
renunciation and signed by the person renouncing37 1 within
six months of the death of the decedent or six months after the
taker or the interest is ascertained. 72 Once renounced the
interest passes as if the renouncing person had predeceased
the decedent or the donee as applicable to the particular situation." ' Specified actions by the person attempting to renounce will bar the right.37 ' Limitations upon the person's
interest in the property, such as a spendthrift clause, do not,
however, affect the right to renounce. 78 Because of the potential importance of the right to renounce to postmortem
planning,"' a full elaboration of the applicable rules is desirable.
INTERVAL
A few preliminary concluding remarks are appropriate
at this point of this multipart article. The above discussion
indicates that in some of the areas discussed present Wyoming
law is adequate. The discussion also demonstrates that in
some of the other areas discussed present Wyoming law is
368. ATKINSON, supra note 365, § 139.
369. U.P.C. § 2-801, Comment at 63.
370. U.P.C. § 2-801(a). This provision permits an heir to renounce although
such a person could not at common law because title was held to pass
immediately upon death. ATKINSON, supra note 365, § 139, at 776. This
rule has caused severe tax consequences in some cases. See, e.g., Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952).
371. U.P.C. § 2-801(a).
372. U.P.C. § 2-801(b).
373.
374.

U.P.C. 2-801(c).
U.P.C. § 2-801(d).

375. U.P.C. § 2-801 (e)
376. See e.g., Note, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 567 (1968).
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confused, archaic and totally lacking. In addition, an all encompassing criticism of Wyoming statutory law is that it lacks
many of the meritorious features of modern draftsmanship.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that anyone would
claim that the Uniform Probate Code is a perfect document
and should be enacted by legislatures without alteration. On
the other hand, it is just as untenable a proposition that no
reform of present intestacy and testacy laws is needed and
even if needed the Code is an inadequate document and should
not be considered. In the middle is a persuasive argument
that the Code represents an extremely useful manual for reform which should occur in the future concerning the areas
of law discussed. It also represents a reason or motivation for
reform in this area. Because it exists and because it is so comprehensive, it gives legislatures and legislatures' committees
an excellent opportunity to review not just part of the law
of distribution at death but the whole multi-subject area. The
Code gives hope that much needed uniformity and modernization is a real possibility.
Wyoming should consider the Code with these factors in
mind.
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